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ABSTRACT 
For the past five years, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) have 
relentlessly labored on recruiting and retention efforts to achieve both their quantitative 
and qualitative missions of recruiting and retaining. Currently, there is not enough 
research into why prior service recruitment of formerly separated Soldiers, known as 
boomerang Soldiers, is a cheaper and more viable recruitment option. Using an in-depth 
case study of civilian sector boomerang policies, this thesis shows what the Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) and even the Army at large can learn from a civilian sector that 
embraces hiring former employees. This thesis examines the value of recruiting former 
SOF Soldiers and why effective high-cost methods of recruitment and retention through 
bonuses/special and incentive pay (S&I pay) may be unsustainable in a fiscally 
conservative future. A future Army faces the unknown effects of the military’s new 
Blended Retirement System (BRS), growing economic concerns, and COVID-19 
aftereffects. This thesis explains why a boomerang Soldier recruitment policy is 
cheaper for the U.S. military and serves to reduce monetary personnel 
expenditures while achieving both quantity and quality in SOF recruiting and 
retention. The thesis recommends prescriptive steps needed for a boomerang policy 
to be implemented as an innovative talent recruitment solution for SOF. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For the past five years, Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) recruiting and 
retention efforts have incessantly labored to achieve both their quantitative and qualitative 
mission of recruiting and retaining ARSOF officers.1 Senior leaders in USAREC 
acknowledge the advantages of social media and various opensource outlets for effective 
recruitment and retention strategies for the 21st century.2 Nevertheless, further revision is 
needed to adjust to the newer generations’ changing culture. Recent research addresses 
how bonuses/special and incentive pay (S&I pay) is effective at increasing retention but 
only at great financial cost. This is a practice that may be unsustainable in a fiscally 
conservative future as the Army braces itself to withstand the unknown effects of the 
military’s new Blended Retirement System (BRS), economic concerns, and COVID-19 
aftereffects.  
There is not enough research into why prior service recruitment of formerly 
separated Soldiers is a cheaper and more viable recruitment method; this study will help to 
fill in those gaps. Rather than expending millions of dollars on broad advertising campaigns 
and massive bonuses or costly S&I pay increases, the Army should take a deeper look into 
the often-overlooked group of prior service recruits, known in the private sector as 
boomerang employees. Many officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) exit the 
military to find that the grass is not greener on the civilian side and face many impediments 
to assessing back into military service.3 By focusing on psychological operations 
(PYSOPS), civilian affairs (CA), and special forces (SF) Soldiers, we seek to show that 
prudent relaxation and reformation of prior service recruiting policies would increase the 
ability of Special Operations Forces (SOF) recruiters to fill this manning gap with 
 
1 Curtis Lowry, “ARSOF Inventory Review CG, USASOC,” (presentation, HRC HQ, Fort Knox, KY, 
June 30, 2020). 
2 James Long, “It’s Not the Economy: Why the Army Missed Its Recruitment Goals and What to Do 
About It,” Modern War Institute, February 14, 2019, https://mwi.usma.edu/not-economy-army-missed-
recruitment-goals/. 
3 “How Can We Leave The Military Without Regret?,” Spousebuzz, March 12, 2013, 
https://www.military.com/spousebuzz/blog/2013/03/how-can-we-leave-the-military-without-regret.html. 
2 
previously separated SOF personnel. This option will not only be cheaper for the U.S. 
military in the long run but will also serve to reduce monetary and personnel expenditures, 
while achieving both quantity and quality in recruiting and retention. The critical reason 
for this thesis is to identify what applicable policies the SOF and even the Army at large 
can learn from the civilian sector about different talent management techniques that solve 
the problem of innovative talent recruitment. Overall, SOF can learn a lot from diverse 
business sector policies that show how to best tap into the overlooked pool of potential 
boomerang soldiers. 
This thesis will focus on PYSOPS, CA and SF Soldiers, while it will exclude the 
Rangers from ARSOF since they are quite a different organization.4 To clarify as to why, 
the Ranger regiment and SOF have differing extraneous physical and mental selection 
processes of their members and have completely different mission sets. The Ranger 
regiment mission set is focused on conventional warfighting whereas SOF is focused on 
unconventional warfare and search and rescue. Becoming a member in SOF is highly 
selective and requires much more training than the members of the Ranger regiment. Such 
selective and total investment in one individual service member should be an investment 
that should be retained and targeted for recruitment even after they exit military service.  
We argue that prudent relaxation and reformation of current directives outlined in 
U.S. Code Title 10 and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would increase 
the ability of recruiters within the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (SORB) to better 
fill this manning gap with diversified, trained, qualified, and seasoned personnel. SORB 
can implement advanced targeting techniques and reformed policies to find and entice prior 
service members to rejoin the force. Recruiting prior service members is similar to the 
competitive business sector as “boomerang employees,” a desired method of talent 
management and diversification of an organization.5 Due to the total cost of training and 
equipping a single SOF Soldier, recruiting already qualified SOF members would not only 
 
4 Eric Sof, “Tier 3 Military Units,” Spec Ops Magazine, October 3, 2019, https://special-ops.org/tier-3-
special-operations-forces/. 
5 Todd Nordstrom and David Strut, “Boomerang Employees: 3 Reasons to Rehire and 2 Reasons to 
Avoid Them,” Forbes, May 31, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidsturt/2018/05/31/boomerang-
employees-3-reasons-to-rehire-and-2-reasons-to-avoid-them/. 
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be cheaper for the U.S. military but will also serve to reduce monetary and personnel 
expenditures. Moreover, this accessions methodology would also help achieve both 
quantity and quality service members. Using outdated recruiting and retention advertising 
methods, recruiting efforts have failed to implement the needed changes to connect with 
the rapidly changing socio demographics and constant job changes that are a developing 
phenomenon in America’s upcoming generation.6 The loss of qualified and seasoned SOF 
officers and NCOs greatly hinders the capabilities and potential of SOF to compete in the 
long-term strategic competition between great power nations. Therefore, it is imperative 
for the Army to re-analyze its policies on recruiting prior service Soldiers. This thesis will 
focus on current options for officers and enlisted from SF, CA and PSYOPS to come back 
in as a warrant officer, NCO, or officer, as well as the need for more relaxed restrictions 
on prior service recruitment practices. 
A. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is not designed to criticize current recruitment methods. Instead, we seek 
to illuminate the opportunities and benefits of boomerang Soldier recruitment in the hopes 
that a boomerang policy implementation would further strengthen current recruitment 
methods. This thesis explores ways to improve what SOF already does to target lost talent 
whom the authors believe will prove crucial to fiscally constrained 21st century operations. 
This thesis frames the problem of losing talent and offers the framework for a solution 
through targeting boomerang re-employment opportunities. Nevertheless, to enact 
boomerang re-employment as policy in SOF and possibly throughout the Army, further in-
depth research on full implementation and effects will be required. To frame the problem, 
we will examine the current procedures and policies for prior service recruitment of SF, 
CA and PSYOPS SOF officers and enlisted to ascertain if current recommendations for 
policy are needed. The primary means of collecting qualitative data for this research project 
is the review of policy, regulations, manuals, interviews with ARSOF Branch managers, 
and extensive use of RAND research. The basis of this research is on secondary data and 
other officially published information that was collected from official journals, articles, 
 
6 Long, “It’s Not the Economy.” 
4 
military doctrine policies, web resources and published Rand Corporation research. The 
framework for a solution is explained by comparing SOF’s recruiting procedures to the 
business sector and other branches of the U.S. military. Another primary focus will be a 
comparative analysis of what it costs to create SOF Soldiers and why they are worth 
targeting for recruitment even after they separate from the service. Using current research 
data on intrinsic motivators, like belonging to an elite group versus extrinsic motivators 
such as monetary gain, this thesis will reveal new recommendations for how SOF can 
strengthen its recruiting practices with more focus on prior service recruitment of 
boomerang Soldiers. 
A brief history of recruiting practices and their methodology to obtain recruiting 
quotas will be followed by a study of the U.S. Air Force and its prior service recruiting and 
retention practices. We will briefly analyze financial extrinsic incentives when compared 
to intrinsic incentives. This will be aided by published RAND research and HRC Survey 
data that lays out why SOF Soldiers decided to get out of military service and become 
civilians and why others decided to stay in. This will aid in ascertaining what intrinsic and 
extrinsic factors future recruiting efforts must consider. By comparing the findings from 
each study, we will draw recommendations for policy and procedure change for their future 
analysis and implementation. Within these branches of service, we will analyze new and 
old policies that have helped the military adjust to changing times and offer up evidence 
that a prior service recruitment policy would further help the military. We will also analyze 
the effects of a poor economy and a flourishing economy and their effects on recruitment 
and retention. Additionally, we will use extensive research from RAND to address how 
bonuses and S&I pay are effective but costly. We will conduct a brief fiscal comparison of 
current practices of retention and recruitment using bonuses and S&I pay versus prior 
service recruitment. By using case studies and previously collected research data from 
RAND and SF HRC, a better understanding of recruitment practices will paint a clearer 
picture of what changes should be recommended. Overall, we will seek to prove that prior 
service recruitment is a valid option when lack of funding becomes a prominent issue.  
5 
B. STRUCTURE
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter II will review the elements of U.S. Code
and policies that govern manning, retention, recruiting and attrition in relation to SOF. By 
examining the background of these elements, we will then delve into what current policies 
exist in relation to prior service recruitment and what problems currently exist. Chapter III 
is a case study of the boomerang employee in the civilian sector and how the issues and 
successes faced in the civilian sector are applicable to helping solve similar military issues. 
Chapter IV will delve into the reasoning behind military services not embracing the hiring 
of boomerangs and why targeting former SOF Soldiers for recruitment is fiscally 
responsible. Chapter V will describe the effects of the Blended Retirement System and 
why re-hiring prior service Soldiers may be a solution to future recruiting challenges. 
Chapter VI will examine the points covered and Chapter VII and VIII will provide 
recommendations and direction for actions to take in the future.  
6 
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7 
II. MANNING REGULATIONS, RETENTION AND
RECRUITING POLICY BACKGROUND
A. SOF BACKGROUND
To understand if prior service recruitment of officers and enlisted in SOF needs
revision to address filling manning gaps, one needs to understand the current role and 
function of ARSOF and how they are managed. Doing so, will shed light that ARSOF 
talent management is inadequately managed in comparison to that of other branches within 
the Army. According to the Army Human Resource Center (HRC) publication, ARSOF 
2022, Senior leaders of ARSOF are focused on the human domain of the force. The 
difficulty in creating such a force is that, once created, it must be maintained due to the 
difficulty of recruiting, training, and qualifying such elite Soldiers. Moreover, the complex 
mission set given to ARSOF is led and executed by individuals of the highest caliber. 
Senior leaders in ARSOF argue that the force is not manned nor managed to keep up with 
the emergent threats:  
The current force structure, manpower and equipment are not optimized for 
this dispersed operational footprint. Therefore, we must develop and 
validate flexible, scalable, and responsive distributed command and control 
structures. Humans are more important than hardware. Quality is better than 
quantity. Special operations forces cannot be mass produced. Competent 
special operations forces cannot be created after emergencies occur.7 
United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) operates in almost 100 
various countries at any given time, doing its part in protecting U.S. interests and allies 
abroad.8 The special operations community has been taking more than its fair share of the 
ongoing counter insurgency operations in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, as they serve a 
critical role in combatting identified terror groups, achieving what conventional forces 
cannot.  
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ARSOF 2022. PB 80–13-SE (Fort Knox, KY, Headquarters, 
Department of the Army), accessed September 19, 2020, 
https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/DOTDP/_pdf/GRAD/ARSOF2022.pdf. 
8 Andrew Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, CRS 
Report No. RS21048 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2020), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf. 
8 
Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) play a significant role in most U.S. 
military operations. Over the past twenty years, ARSOF have been given greater 
responsibility for planning and conducting counterterrorism operations on every continent. 
U.S. Special Operations command (USSCOM) has approximately 70,000 Active Duty, 
National Guard, reserve and civilian personnel (about 2,500) from all four components and 
sub unified commands.9 ARSOF currently constitutes 33,000 Soldiers of the total 
personnel strength of 70,000.10 Further broken down, Feickert identifies that ARSOF is 
organized into “Special Forces, Ranger, and special operations aviation units, along with 
civil affairs units, military information units”.11 Five active duty Special Forces (SF) 
groups are strength/slated for 1,400 Soldiers each (7,000). These groups are stationed at a 
variety of places throughout the CONUS region, FT Bragg, FT Lewis, FT Campbell, FT 
Carson and Eglin Air Force Base.12 These “Green Berets,” specialize in foreign languages 
and are equipped to operate in relatively small teams, independently throughout the world. 
Additionally, there are two Army National Guard SF groups headquartered in Utah and 
Alabama. Feickert argues that the most deployed SOF assets are Civil Affairs (CA). It is 
to be recognized that 95th CA Brigade is the only active unit that supports USSOCOM.13 
All other CA units reside in the reserves and support general purpose forces. Formerly 
referred to as psychological operations, Military Information Support Operations (MISO) 
units disseminate information to large foreign audiences through mass media. There are 
currently two active duty Military Information Support Groups (MISG’s) stationed at FT 
Bragg, NC, providing support to geographic combatant commands.14 For the FY 2020, 
USSOCOM budget requested a 2.2% manpower increase from 71,612 to 73,204.15 Of this 
 
9 Feickert, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), 2. 
10 Feickert, 2. 
11 Feickert, 2. 
12 Feickert, 2. 
13 Feickert, 3. 
14 Feickert, 4. 
15 Feickert, 7. 
9 
increase, ARSOF requests a force structure of 35,976, which is an increase of over 2,967 
Soldiers for the year 2020.16  
B. FOCUSING ON THE HUMAN DOMAIN OF ARSOF
ARSOF’s top priority is investment into its human capital. According to a recent
publication, “ARSOF 2022,” ARSOF’s priorities are focused on six enabling concepts 
which are believed to allow the force to direct and shape the future development of the 
force.17 Furthermore, the investment in human capital is ARSOF’s top priority, arguing 
that the force strives to be the best educated, trained and equipped special operations 
formation in the world, achieving success in the 21st century battlefield.18 According to the 
report, ARSOF intends to focus on three areas to increase individual soldier readiness. 
First, ARSOF will focus on enhancing education and training in problem solving and 
technical skills like language and cultural expertise while simultaneously increasing 
advantage through human capital development. Second, senior leaders in ARSOF intend 
on diversifying the force so that ARSOF may be more successful in the human domain. 
Third, and most importantly, the preservation of the force and families by focusing on the 
quality of life of the family members, as both Soldiers and their families face the 
extraordinary demand of SF operations.19 
Currently, the Army talent management system is based on the historical 
promotion-based system. This is known as the up or out system, you either move up or are 
removed out of the service. Several of the key issues allowing both prior service and 
enlisted personnel to re-enter the military are associated with the promotion-based system. 
This system of time in service and the up-or-out traditional system has left Soldiers with 
little options, leave the service and face denied reentry.20 Understanding that qualified 
officers and NCOs were being forced out due to the archaic promotion system, changes 
16 Feickert, 8. 
17 Headquarters, Department of the Army,  ARSOF 2022, 17. 
18 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 18.  
19 Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20. 
20 Scott Maucione, “Are Some of the Army’s Best Soldiers Being Forced out?” Federal News 
Network, October 31, 2016. https://federalnewsnetwork.com/army/2016/10/army-best-soldiers-forced-out/. 
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were made by congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2018. A 
particularly noteworthy change was in Section 572 of the NDAA which required the 
Secretary of Defense, with the consultation of respective secretaries of the military 
departments, to provide two reports to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees 
on polices for both Active and Reserve component career management.21 The first report 
covered promotion list sequencing, and the second addressed fifteen elements of promotion 
and career management issues.22 This bill pushed more promotion decisions to the 
individual services to allow the creation of alternative career paths for both officer and 
enlisted. Rather than committing career fratricide, this new bill encourages self-
development through fellowships, outside graduate degree programs, and other critical 
broadening assignments.23 This bill focuses on the talent and potential of the individual for 
promotion rather than dates of commission. The introduction of the skills-based promotion 
system will compete with the private-sector competition that offers promotion based on 
merit and skill sets.24 The changes the bill offers may help boost retention incentives 
whenever retention rates are in competition with a thriving economy and the blended 
retirement system (BRS), which offers smaller pension checks and an opportunity to exit 
the military midcareer with matched funds. 
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) is the current 
system which places limits on the number of officers who can serve in certain grades, 
keeping the mid and high-level officers’ low. Recruiters are currently faced with the 
difficulty of filling the increased recruiting quotas while many new recruits leave soon after 
their initial service obligation.25 Exhausted by continuous high operational tempo 
(OPTEMPO) deployment cycles, officers and enlisted have few compelling reasons, other 
 
21 Albert Robbert, Katherine Kidder, Caitlin Lee, Agnes Schaefer, and William Waggy, Officer 
Career Management: Steps Toward Modernization in the 2018 and 2019 National Defense Authorization 
Acts. RR-2875-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), iii, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2875.  
22 Robbert et al., Officer Career Management, iii. 
23 Robbert et al., xiv. 
24 Robbert et al., 5. 
25 Long, “It’s Not the Economy.” 
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than job security, to stay, whereas the private sector offers more lucrative careers.26 SOF 
is not only faced with quantity issues but quality issues of its service members.27 With the 
new National Security Strategy focusing on great power competition, the who (Russia, 
China, North Korea) is a mirror image of the 20th century threats but the how (Cyber, 
Economic, Artificial Intelligence) is much different. The lost quality and skills of separated 
SOF Soldiers greatly hinders the capabilities and potential of SOF to compete in the long-
term strategic competition between great power nations.28  
The current system of recruitment and retention is propped up by expensive 
bonuses and S&I pay funding. During fiscal year (FY) 2000 and FY 2008, the DoD budget 
for enlistment and reenlistment bonuses was more than doubled. The budget for enlisted 
Soldier bonuses jumped from $266 million to $625 million and from $891 million to $1.4 
billion for selective reenlistment bonuses.29 These expensive funding increases solved the 
recruitment and retention issues of the time brought about by fast deployment cycles,  but 
what was not explored was the cost value and benefits of a boomerang Soldier program. 
Rand research concluded that the enlistment bonus and reenlistment bonus programs aided 
heavily in the Army’s ability to meet recruiting and retention demands over the years.30 
Massive amounts of money in the form of bonuses as shown in recent research can solve 
the retention and recruiting issues of SOF, but is ultimately unsustainable and fiscally 
irresponsible in a fiscally constrained future.31 Therefore, current prior service recruitment 
of SF, CA and PSYOPS officers and NCOs in SOF needs further analysis, to ultimately 
determine how to best fulfill current and future manning gaps. 
26 Maucione, “Are Some of the Army’s Best Soldiers Being Forced Out?” 
27 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. H. R. 5515 (2018). 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr5515/BILLS-115hr5515enr.pdf. 
28 Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022. 
29 Asch and USA, Cash Incentives and Military Enlistment, Attrition, and Reenlistment, iii. 
30 Asch and USA, 108. 
31 Beth Asch, Michael G. Mattock, James Hosek, and Shanthi Nataraj, Assessing Retention and 
Special and Incentive Pays for Army and Navy Commissioned Officers in the Special Operations Forces. 
RR 1796-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019. 
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C. ARSOF SHOULD BE MAINTAINED NOT BUILT 
Part of the manning issue, particularly at the senior captain and major ranks is 
centered on the number of officers and or senior noncommissioned officers (NCOs) 
required to support the unrelenting and arduous operating environment SOF finds itself in. 
The other part of the manning issue is focused on the ability to provide flexibility to 
midcareer officers and NCOs that both manages talent and improves upon their quality of 
life. The significant constraints that SOF faces to better manage the size of its force boils 
down to the NDAA, commissioning programs and available assignments to officers who 
are in that Army Competitive Category (ACC).  
With just a little research and time, it would not take someone long to figure out 
the SOF community is facing significant personnel challenges with its senior company 
grade and junior Field Grade officers. Over the past ten years the forces have seen a steady 
decline of its seasoned senior Captains and junior Majors. For example, in FY 2019, the 
SF Regiment hit a peak of 18A captains-to-positions fill rate of 82% with a trough of 70% 
when measured monthly.32 Moreover, analysts and branch managers of the SF community 
assess that officer year groups from 09–13 will all fall significantly short in producing a 
healthy post intermediate level education (ILE) cohort of SF officers due to historic 
attrition rates.33 With the current up-or-out promotion system, non-accession branches such 
as the SF find it difficult to compensate for the rise and fall in year group attrition rates.34 
Without significant reform to the SF talent management program, senior leaders will need 





32 A.W. Simmons, “Special Forces Branch Update.” Human Resources Command Special Forces, 
Branch Update, 1, no. 1 (July 1, 2019): 12. 
33 Christopher Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief.” Presented at the Talent Management Brief, FT 
Knox, KY, HRC HQ, March 5, 2020. 
34 Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief.” 
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Mark Mitchell, principal deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for Special 
Operations and Low Intensity Conflict shared his concerns about manning the SF Force: 
The current requirement for Army Special Forces is 685 officers and 
enlisted soldiers. I think we are going to hit 470 this year; we must find 
some new ways to reach into some untapped pools. The barrier to SOF entry 
is high and will remain high. We do not intend to drop the standards, and 
we are committed to that, but we really need to look at attacking those other 
pools. Around 30 percent of American high schoolers meet the 
requirements to join the service, and even fewer of them can meet the 
demands of the special operations community.” 35 
As outlined in the Army publication, “How the Army Runs,” the most critical 
challenge Army Senior Leaders and Commanders face is managing resources in a 
constrained environment.36 Army leaders must ensure the force is trained, equipped, and 
maintained to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). As the Army 
seeks ways to keep up with a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) 
operational environment, it must first examine how it implements policies that creates a 
sustainable level of readiness.37 Senior leaders must create a sustainable level of readiness 
with a limited amount of authorized personnel, while battling the ever changing global 
environment, intricate approval processes, and multi-levels of bureaucratic red tape.  
For the past decade, the Army’s modernization has been centered on the tradeoffs 
between readiness, technological advancement, capacity, and overall size of the force. The 
Army has chosen readiness as the top priority.38 Note that readiness does not equate to 
large capacity, rather, it is referring to doing more with less. The decision to focus on 
readiness has resulted in many Army programs being restructured, with particular focus on 
35Matthew Cox, “Pentagon Official: Recruiting Problems Could Alter Special Ops Mission,” 
Military.com, February 28, 2018. https://www.military.com/DoDbuzz/2018/02/28/pentagon-official-
recruiting-problems-could-alter-special-ops-mission.html. 
36 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. U.S. Army War College, 2018. 
https://ssilrc.army.mil/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/How-the-Army-Runs.pdf, 1–1. 
37 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs, viii. 
38 Arpi Dilanian and Matthew Howard, “The Number One Priority: An Interview with Gen. Mark 
Milley,” U.S. Army, November 4, 2019. 
https://www.army.mil/article/219028/the_number_one_priority_an_interview_with_gen_mark_milley. 
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force restructuring.39 The NDAA for the fiscal year 2020 decreased the authorized total 
end strength of the Army to 1,005,500, a decrease of 24,000 across the force.40 However, 
even with a force increase, senior leaders in the Army will continue to operate with even 
fewer resources, maintaining a focus of quality over quantity.41 Though available resources 
are important, currently an issue that is of even greater importance is maintaining the will 
of those currently serving, ensuring they continue to serve past their initial service 
obligation.42 Thus, to meet the demands of the operational and institutional Army, 
flexibility and innovation will be of paramount importance in the years ahead.  
D. DOES ARSOF HAVE A MANNING ISSUE?
The discussion of manning is not as clear cut as most would think. Those who are
not well versed in the variables regarding Army personnel management may assume there 
is an authorized/finite number of billets for each rank in each branch. While this may be 
the fundamental framework in force structure, it is not the only driving factor. In fact, 
defining manning and readiness is rather opaque and governed by a complicated 
bureaucratic process.  
To better understand if the ARSOF has a manning problem, one needs to 
understand how U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC) and Headquarters of the 
Department of the Army (HQDA) views the Army’s strength. Each level has similar views, 
but at the same time very different conclusions regarding strength of the force. Simply put, 
HRC and its branches tend to focus more on the short-term force structure and the near-
term promotion projections, while HQDA focuses on the long term, ensuring they keep in 
constant check with the legal authorizations outlined by Congress.  
39 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs, 1–3. 
40 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, S. 1790 § (2020), 
https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.pdf. 
41 Michael O’Hanlon and James Miller, “Focusing on Quality over Quantity in the U.S. Military 
Budget.” Policy 2020: Brookings (blog), December 2, 2019. 
https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/focusing-on-quality-over-quantity-in-the-us-military-
budget/. 
42 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs, 3–7. 
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Each year, prior to the publication of the yearly NDAA, the Secretary of the Army 
(SECARMY) and the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) go before Congress and brief the 
Army’s Annual Posture Statement (APS) of the total Army (Active, National Guard, and 
Reserve). The APS is the official written testimony to congressional leaders on the assessed 
state and readiness of the Army. The SECARMY and the CSA explain how the Army will 
utilize the FY 2021 budget request to meet the mission of the Army. Simply put, the APS 
explains how the allocated budget to the Army will support the NDS by ensuring: 
readiness, modernization, and reform.43 As with all the other service branches, the manning 
allotments are governed by U.S. Federal laws outlined in the yearly Congress-approved 
NDAA and U.S. Code Title-10 for Active Duty and Reserve, and U.S. Code Title 32 for 
the National Guard.44 The NDAA and its subsections are used by the HQDA in determining 
promotions and accessions. Each year, Congress publishes the NDAA, which provides the 
authorized amount of Title 10 and Title 32 military Officers and Enlisted. The NDAA’s 
authorization of total Army personnel does not specifically state the ranks or how many 
officers, NCOs, and enlisted there will be, just the total amount of authorized Soldiers.45 
Refer to Figure 1. The total force end strength is then used in conjunction with U.S. Code 
Title 10, of which governs commissioned officer end strength in ratio to that in the force.46 
43 Steven Redmann, “Army Posture Statement 2020,” U.S. Army, March 13, 2020. 
https://www.army.mil/standto/archive/2020/03/13/index.html. 
44 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs, 9–24. 
45 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020. 




This section establishes the limits for field grade ranks based on the overall size of the 
officer corps in the ACC. 
Figure 1. Officer Strength & Distribution in Grade from CH. 3247  
Section 523 of U.S. Code Title 10 seen in Figure 1 depicts the authorized strengths 
of commissioned officers on active duty in grades of major, lieutenant colonel and colonel. 
To find this specified allocation, all commissioned officers are counted; those outlined in 
subparagraph b of section 523 (current FY) are then subtracted from the total Army officer 
strength.48 In short, it is not field grade officers compared to company grade officers, it is 
field grades as a portion of the overall size of the officer corps that is subject to the 
limitations of section 523. Referring to Figure 1, if the total ACC officer corps is 20,000 
 
47 Source: “Title 10.” 
48 “Title 10.” 
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then there can only be 7,768 majors, 5,253 lieutenant colonels, and 1,613 colonels. 
Subsection b depicts officers that are excluded in computing and determining authorized 
strengths.  
To determine which branch gets allocated what and how many, Senior leaders in 
the HQDA G3 and G1, use the Army’s Force Management Model which assess seven 
functions to effectively manage the Army.49 Moreover, the force development process uses 
the assessments from the Army Framework Concept (AFC). The AFC is comprised of 
several sub-components that assess how the Army force will perform in a particular 
military function in a range of military operations six to eight years in the future.50 Through 
a wargaming process, AFC then produces detailed classified concept of operations 
(CONOPs) that provide senior leaders a capabilities assessment. This assessment captures 
what is needed at the operational level to achieve the desired end state of the National 
Security Strategy (NSS). This assessment is then used by senior leaders to determine how 
the force will be organized, equipped, and manned.51 Using the AFC assessments, strategic 
senior military leaders use the force structure model and begin the force development 
process. Force development begins with assessing operational capabilities that are desired 
of the Army as specified from the NSS and the approved NDS.  
Although this is not the only step to assess the needs of the force, it is a system of 
systems used in the force management process and it is the first and most critical 
assessment. The final product of this assessment is the development of the organizational 
authorizations (manpower and equipment) in congruence with the authorized manning 
strength outlined in the NDS and U.S. Code title 10 and 32, to achieve an effective and 
affordable force.52 Moreover, this process determines the Army’s Doctrine, Organization, 
Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P).53 
49 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 3–1. 
50 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 3–12. 
51 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 2–2. 
52 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 3–9. 
53 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 3–9. 
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Using the approved fiscal end strength, the DoD issues the budget proposal and 
End Strength guidance. Using this guidance HQDA G3 and G1 work closely with HRC in 
determining the approved strength for each of the branches, known as authorized strength/
force structure documents.54 These strength documents, although not legally binding, 
outline the total number of personnel by military occupation specialty that is required to 
both achieve the mission as well as keep in line with the approved manpower strength 
authorized by Congress. From the human resource (HR) acquisition perspective, this 
function must consider the recruitment, attrition rates, and accessions in concert with 
healthy management of promotions. In conclusion, what is outlined in Title 10 section 523 
and what was approved in the NDAA, must be balanced by law. Simply promoting more 
officers to fill vacancies is illegal.   
E. OPERATING STRENGTH VS. TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH  
This is where the water begins to become opaque as to the strength of the ACC 
branches (including SOF community) in the views of HQDA vs. HRC. The prescribed 
force structure documents are given to HRC, describing how branches should design the 
force. From the lens of HQDA, their focus is on the “Total Strength” of each branch, which 
is the authorizations plus Transients, Trainees Holdees, and Students (TTHS). Whereas 
HRC is centered on the Operational Strength, what is available for mission.55 Of course, to 
keep it challenging, there is no set amount of THS provided by HQDA or Congress.56 The 
THS is a calculation created by the HRC G1.  
• Total Strength = Operating Strength + TTHS  
• Operating Strength = Total Strength – TTHS 
In short, the HQDA focuses primarily on the physical numbers of the Total Army 
whereas HRC will focus on operational strength. Additionally, there is a complex variant 
in how HQDA will account for officers and NCOs in a promotable status. HQDA does not 
account for officers in a promotable status as the next higher rank, they focus on only the 
 
54 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 3–13. 
55 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 12–3. 
56 Army War College (US), How The Army Runs. 12–3. 
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current pay grade. Whereas HRC will account for those promotable officers and NCOs as 
the next higher grade to predict the present and short-term available personnel strength for 
mission sets. Often, the operational strength of a specific rank is far different than that of 
the total strength. This is typically seen when accounting for SF captains and junior majors 
when they are in a THS position. When comparing against authorized structure, branch 
managers compare operating strength against the total strength with those in THS.57 The 
legal strength limit is often too low in a specific branch and the size of the THS population 
is often too high which results in a disproportionate imbalance.58 If the strength is too low 
and the THS population is too high, this will result in the branch having more available 
positions open than HRC can fill with operating strength. When that happens, the force can 
pay the price and go short of both officers and enlisted.  
Based off the Special Forces officer inventory reports of 2020, there is a significant 
disparity between what HRC sees as a “healthy” Officer pool and that of HQDA.59 
According to Branch managers at HRC, there is a considerable shortage between 
Operational Strength and Total Strength.60 According to the report, both operational 
strength and total strength is significantly under manned.61  
F. THE WAY FORWARD
Understanding what governs the total Army end strength is considerably important
when discussing talent management of the force. Regarding officer force structure, there is 
a significant difference between officers in the ACC and officers outlined in subsection b 
of Section 523, which pertains to coding of material and immaterial positions. The officers 
in Subsection b are not counted against the total Army composition.  
Material positions are those positions that are specific to those specific skills of 
select military occupational specialties (MOS)/area of concentrations (AOC), an example 
57 Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief: Human Resources Command.” 
58 Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief: Human Resources Command.” 
59 Lowry, “ARSOF Inventory Review CG, USASOC (30 June 2020).” 
60 Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief: Human Resources Command.” 
61 Couch, “Special Forces Branch Brief: Human Resources Command.” 
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of which is a 13A/Field Artillery Officer or 11A/Infantry Officer. Positions coded as AOC/
MOS specific (material), such as a commander of a Field Artillery Unit, can only be 
fulfilled by the corresponding AOC/MOS officer/enlisted and no other.62 In other words, 
a Field Artillery Officer cannot fulfill positions that have been coded for a medical or Judge 
Advocate General (JAG) officer. Immaterial positions are positions that can be fulfilled by 
any officer in the ACC or with general AOC/MOS specifications.63 Positions such as 
Recruiting command or positions on a Joint Staff are often not AOC/MOS specific and can 
be typically filled by any officer or soldier in the ACC.64 Officers not listed in the ACC 
(subsection b) are significantly restricted in available immaterial positions, limiting them 
as to those AOC/MOS positions.65 This is a key point when discerning how to classify the 
SOF branches. If a branch is in the ACC, it may have an officer corps that is greater than 
its material authorized positions. This ability allows a branch to become more diversified 
with the flexibility to have a greater number of field grade officers than what was allocated 
for the branch. However, this ability can also be a crux to a branch structured like SOF that 
can barely fulfill its material positions let alone its immaterial positions.  
The SF CPT/MAJ inventories described previously do not capture how many 
officers are filling excess positions that are necessary for the SF Groups to operate. As of 
September 2019, there were only 23 Majors (MAJs) authorized at each of the SF groups, 
and every single one is manned with over 29 MAJs.66 Those excess MAJs are used to fulfill 
four Global War on Terrorism Planner positions, with the Group Operations Officer (S3) 
and the ARSOF support cell (ASC) commander positions all being excess. Moreover, these 
numbers do not capture how many officers and especially CPTs are filling immaterial 
positions, are in school, or are in training. The special forces groups need six excess SF 
 
62 “Immaterial & Personnel Special Reporting Codes,” Uniformed Services University | Center for 
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majors to just make mission with their constantly deployed elements. MAJ Couch, the SF 
branch manager for Majors reports said: “The SF Groups are at roughly 80 percent fill on 
CPTs, and we are not filling any of the authorizations outside of the SF Groups. Because 
SOF groups do not use CPTs to fill the SF CPT positions outside of the SF Groups, they 
are forced to fill some of the CPT positions with MAJs.” 67 Moreover, MAJ Couch also 
revealed that the SF branch has to provide up to 36 excess MAJs at the SF Groups and 
SWC. Lastly, he pointed out that the officers in advanced schools, and the roughly 65 
CPT’s positions throughout the Army, actually equate to approximately 200 positions that 
are not captured in HRC’s observations.68 It is important to note that this does not include 
officers that serve in the Special Mission Units (SMU’s), or immaterial positions. Again, 
although the numbers may seem as if the SF Branch is healthy, earnestly, it is significantly 
undermanned.  
As part of the ACC, SF branch is required to fulfill immaterial positions, positions 
that are not branch specific. Due to a shortage of SF senior captains and majors, SF cannot 
fulfill such mission requirements. If compared to other combat arms, SF just do not have 
the officers to spare, let alone fulfill material positions. In comparison, the infantry branch 
has many more officers than authorizations, so they fill a large amount of immaterial 
positions.69 Infantry has 884 MAJs for 342 positions, which is considered healthy. They 
have 446 LTCs for 216 authorizations. And they have 1925 CPTs for 1291 
authorizations.70 Infantry branch and the other combat arms can fill a huge number of 
immaterial positions because they have so much excess. In theory, if the SOF branch were 
allocated the ability to promote more captains and majors, the branch could contribute more 
to immaterial missions. Therefore, the more SF MAJs allotted, the easier it is for the 
ARSOF branches to help contribute to the rest of the Army. If the SF Branch was put in 
the noncompetitive category outlined in subsection b of 523, those immaterial positions 
would be non-existing. In doing so this would take away the opportunity for Officers and 
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NCOs to step away from the high OPTEMPO and develop as diversified leaders, inevitably 
hindering retention. Again, the SF branch is at a crossroads of personnel talent 
management.  
G. THE SORB AND THE RECRUITING PROCESS 
As any person who has been in recruiting knows, meeting the mission requirements 
of both quantity and quality is extremely difficult but the primary issue is not the quantity, 
it is the quality. Recruiting is a human domain, full of multifaceted factors that influence a 
person’s decision to commit to joining the service. Although SOF recruiting is parallel to 
that of recruiting for the conventional force, SOF recruiting poses its own unique 
challenges and operational environment. As one can imagine, a recruit for the SOF 
community must possess the qualities and attributes that can withstand the austere training 
and hostile environments that operators must often face. For SORB recruiters, quality is 
more pressed upon than quantity.71  
ARSOF recruiting difficulty driven by 
• Size of the Army population 
• Proportion of the Army qualified (currently < 20%) varies significantly 
due to qualification factor adjustments 
• Proponent selection rate 
• Cooperation of candidate’s unit in coordination and ensuring prompt 
arrival to training 72 
 
SORB’s Mission statement:  
• Special Operations Recruiting Battalion (Airborne) conducts targeted, 
deliberate and synchronized recruiting operations (Awareness 
Operations, Engagement Operations, and Activation Operations) within 
the U.S. Army in order to find, prepare, and send the highest volume of 
qualified and capable in-service Officer and Enlisted Soldiers to the 
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U.S. Army Special Operations force, the U.S. Army Warrant Officer 
cohort and the U.S. Army Explosive Ordinance Disposal branch.73 
Although it cannot be overstated that the mission requirements for both quantity 
and quality are difficult to achieve on a yearly basis, the issue of retention supersedes them. 
Bottom line is that the SOF community is maintained not built. The ability to find, recruit, 
and pass the strenuous requirements for SF is not something that can be produced quickly. 
For the past five years, the SORB has either met its officer and enlisted recruitment quota 
or come close on either side, not putting the tactical level positions at risk.74 To accomplish 
this mission, the SOF community has one of three ways: 18X program (no prior service), 
Call to Active Duty, or through the SORB for those serving on active duty. As policy 
stands, there are no past or present mission quota’s for prior service officers and very 
limited quotas for prior service enlisted to come back in for SF, CA and PSYOP. This is 
an impediment to accessing an available pool of talent as even SOF enlisted Soldiers only 
sometimes re-enter service on rare occasions. However, there are little to virtually zero 
ways for a previous SOF officer to re-enter active duty SOF if not already serving in the 
in-active ready reserve or reserve component.75 
The 18X (18 Xray) program is a pre-enlistment option for those recruited from the 
civilian sector. Recruits do not have prior service. This option is a guaranteed way for 
individuals to attend SFAS. Applicants selected for the 18X program are required to attend 
basic training, Infantry one Station Unit Training (OSUT), and Airborne training prior to 
attending the Special Operations Preparation Course (SOPC). In all, the prerequisite 
training lasts for over six months.76 Based on reports from USASOC, recruits who 
successfully complete the SOPC program have an impressive 70% success rate when 
compared to those who are randomly recruited from the active component.77 Most of the 
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Special Forces recruits are from the active duty candidate pool. This program is intended 
to supplement the SF entry pipeline.78 This path does have its faults. Newly qualified SF 
operators from this program will enter the force young and with zero military experience 
aside from their training. This method is intended to fulfill the personnel pipeline at the 
lowest entry level enlisted positions not officers.79 
 The Call to Active Duty (CAD) program is only available to Army Reserve and 
National Guard Officers and only approved for select MOS/Area of Specialty.80 If the CAD 
program is activated, a CAD Military Personnel Message (MILPER) announces an 
opportunity for reservists to fulfill a vacancy position on Active Duty/Title 10.81 CAD 
MILPER Messages announce eligibility based upon assessed critical shortages of select 
military occupational specialties (MOS) from given rank and/or year group of officers. 
Officers that apply for the CAD program must not have any derogatory (DEROG) 
information in their file, not be subjected to RA Involuntary Separation, not be a two time 
Non-Select for promotion; in addition, they must complete 20 years of federal service by 
the age of 62, and maintain the potential to serve at a higher level.82  
• As per the CAD MILPER message 20–176, CAD applicants must 
possess the training and certification for select positions, to be holding 
the position in the reserves. CAD is not a branch transfer program and 
only officers associated with certain billets are approved to take 
advantage of the CAD program.83 Each year will vary and may be 
revised multiple times throughout the year. This is a significant 
drawback for the Army Competitive Category branches, such as SF, as 
they are not approved for the CAD program every FY cycle. 
Nevertheless, those officers and warrant officers who are approved to 
take advantage of the CAD program will incur an additional service 
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obligation (ADSO) of three to five years.84The average amount of time 
it takes to process a CAD application is between 3 to 6 months.85  
This program, at first glance, appears to be a suitable, if not the preferred method 
of fulfillment of critical personnel shortages. Being that it is pulling from personnel who 
are still in the service, be it part time. However, there are three issues to this program: time 
of transfer to active duty, depletion of reserve component, negates prior service officers 
from joining the active component. 
When considering the amount of time it takes for an approved CAD application and 
the additional time it takes for a new Soldier to arrive on station. Six to eight months of 
waiting is often not a viable option for branches with higher than average operational 
tempos and the need for quick replacements. Moreover, the 6–8-month window is 
assuming the reserve component has granted the conditional release. The conditional 
release must be approved at each echelon of command up to include the applicant’s State’s/
Component’s adjutant general (TAG).86 This is no simple transfer process as there are more 
delays to the process since the review boards only happen twice a year. In total, it can 
sometimes take up to 18 months for an applicant to transfer from the reserve component to 
the active component.87 
The CAD program is not the ideal solution to fulfill critical vacant skill sets. Unlike 
the conventional reserve units, the SOF reserve and active components have two separate 
missions, particularly the Psychological and Civil Affairs components. Since November, 
2006, the U.S. reserve component CA and PSYOP units were separated from the U.S. 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the U.S. Joint Forces Command 
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(JFCOM).88 Furthermore, these units were assigned to the U.S. Army Reserve Command 
(USARC). This “divorce” separated the mission set so that the Reserve component 2d and 
7th PSYOP groups would support conventional forces, while the Active Component 4th 
PSYOP Group could concentrate on support of special operations forces.89 If the CAD 
program was open to those select military specialties, then it would essentially “rob Peter 
to pay Paul” and thus diminish one’s capability in supporting the other, exacerbating the 
personnel issue.90  
The 2019 John C. McCain Act made historical changes to talent management with 
brevet promotions. The Army brevet program temporarily promotes officers to serve at the 
next higher rank with matching pay and authority.91 Title V, Section 503 of the 2019 John 
S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act, is one of several new authorities to provide 
the Army the flexibility to better manage the Army Talent Management System. However, 
it is limited to quantity and specific skill sets (see Figure 2 for 2020 Brevet Promotion 
allocations). For the FY 2020, HQDA approved 770 brevet positions (120 captains, 350 
majors, 200 lieutenant colonels, and 100 colonels).92 Overall, five were allocated to the 
Civil Affairs branches, no others to SF or PSYOP.93 This is the first step forward in the 
new program of talent management.  
2019 NDAA, 105–106 
• “under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the military 
department concerned.” The President will make the appointment “by 
and with the advice and consent of the Senate.” To receive such an 
appointment, officers must have a skill that the Army deems in shortage; 
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be in a position designated for a captain, major, lieutenant colonel, or 
colonel; and have the skills required for the position. The Secretary of 
the Army determines if those three criteria are met and will convene a 
board to approve or disapprove the promotion…. “position on the 
active-duty list or the permanent, probationary, or acting status of the 
officer so appointed, prejudice the officer in regard to other promotions 
or appointments, or abridge the rights or benefits of the officer.” 94 
 
Shows the 2020 Allocations for Army Brevet Promotions. 
Figure 2. FY 2020 Allocations for Brevet Promotion95  
A form of brevet promotions known as frocking have existed throughout the entire 
history of the U.S. Army. However, unlike the historical use of brevet promoting or 
(frocking), the promotion came without a pay increase.96 With revision in the 2019 John 
McCain NDAA, officers may now receive pay along with the rank.97 This relative new 
style of brevet promotions can very well give ARSOF a needed boost of both incentive 
programs for retention of talent as well as relief for a critical shortage of majors. Using the 
brevet system, senior captains that have shown potential and talent may be promoted ahead 
of peers, by their branch, rather than wait on board results.  
In a 2017 article from the Army Times titled “Take three years off: Army extends 
sabbatical program” author Jim Tice explains another system in the military called the 
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TRADOC USASOC ARCYBER PSYCH OPS Civil Affairs USFK
CPT 4 0 1 0 0 0
MAJ 21 0 1 7 5 0
LTC 10 4 0 0 0 0
COL 3 3 0 0 0 1
Total 38 7 2 7 5 1
Recommended Critical Position Allocations for Brevet Promotion (21-01 
Assignment Cycle
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Career Intermission Program (CIP). CIP allows all service members the option to transfer 
out of Active duty and into the Individual Ready Reserve for up to 3 years while 
maintaining healthcare and on-base privileges. As specified by Congress, career 
intermission sabbaticals can be no longer than 3 years in length and are available to 
only 20 officers and 20 enlisted soldiers, while ARSOF Soldiers are prohibited from 
even from applying. It was thought that when properly leveraged CIP would have the 
potential to be an unrivaled retention tool to keep talented leaders in. However, unlike the 
other services the program did not get a strong response in the Army, mostly because the 
Army leadership was slow to promote it and approve personnel for the program. Sergeant 
Major of the Army Dan Dailey said, “you don’t want to punish people for doing it, 
but you don’t necessarily want to sell it, either, because not everybody can do it.” 
CSM Dailey also said that “you’ve got to think about the morale of the people that stay 
and the contribution they continue to make.” In contrast the Air force leadership saw 
the program as a win-win where members can follow another passion until they miss 
the service and return to active duty with more experience and drive.98 The Army’s 
lackluster support of the CIP is an example of a program that was implemented 
service wide but lacked the overall support of Army senior leadership to truly add 
value to the organization on a wide scale. 
Lastly, the newest developed area for accessions is the direct appointment to 
Officer/Warrant. Prior to the changes of the 2019 NDAA, direct commissioning programs 
were only allotted to the Medical, JAG, or Chaplin corps. Now, branches can make direct 
commissions to qualified applicants either as a commissioned officer or warrant officer. 
On July 30, 2020 one of the newest direct commissioned officers was Sergeant First Class 
(SFC) Waldon W. Jue (now MAJ Jue).99 Direct commissioning of NCOs allows the Army 
to remain competitive and keep talented enlisted personnel from leaving to the private 
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sector.100 Moreover, it allows the Army to bring in officers with no prior service that have 
desired KSAs (Knowledge, Skills, Abilities). Moreover, the revisions in the NDAA allows 
branches such as the SF to commission superior performing NCOs (E-7 - E-9) to the rank 
of Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2).101 This directive addresses the critical shortage of 
CW2s experienced in the Special Forces while giving some incentive for retention of those 
who have consistently demonstrated superior performance and skills.   
In the past getting an officer back into the Active component with a break in service, 
was extremely hard and often approval was denied. However, with the changes made by 
the 2019 John McCain NDAA paving the way for all branches in the Army to directly 
commission officers up to the rank of O-6/Colonel, this resolves the issue of break in 
service of prior service officers. According to the provisions outlined in the 2019 NDAA, 
branches have the authority to directly commission prior service officers and place either 
on active duty or the reserves.102 This ability will provide great flexibility and force 
management for those that wish to reenter the service and has great applicability for use in 
a boomerang Soldier policy. Army Directive 2019–27 specifically states, “credit for prior 
service as a commissioned officer (except as a commissioned warrant officer) will be 
awarded for previous commissioned service performed in any Military Service.”103 This 
program will not replace the CAD program but rather compliments it by providing a 
method for those who have completely removed themselves from service. This policy 
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III. BOOMERANG EMPLOYEE 
The civilian sector has a unique term for individuals who departed a business and 
then returned to work in brand-new or enlarged roles. They are known as boomerang 
employees or boomerangs, and for this case study we use the phrase boomerang Soldiers. 
The term boomerang was invented to classify high performing alumni that are either 
deliberately targeted and re-hired, or individuals that return voluntarily following some 
absence from the organization. Steve Jobs from Apple and Howard Schultz of Starbucks 
are but a few of the most prominent individuals who were once boomerang employees that 
returned to their former employers and added great value to the organization.104 
This chapter will seek to further define and analyze Special Operation Forces (SOF) 
retention and recruiting strategies in respect to recruiting those Soldiers from Special 
Forces (SF), Psychological Operations (PO) and Civil Affairs (CA) that decide to join the 
civilian sector. We will analyze the benefits and limitations of this prior service recruitment 
strategy through the lens of comparison. By comparing and analyzing the re-hiring policies 
of the civilian business world in contrast to SOF, we will be able to discern applicable and 
non-applicable civilian sector policies. There is much that the Army can learn from the 
ever-adaptive policies of human resources in the business sector. The regular SOF methods 
of recruiting from the civilian sector for lower enlisted, from the military at the E-4 to E-6 
level and O-2 level for officers is well studied. However, this relatively underutilized and 
often tertiary former service recruitment option needs further analysis for today’s 
challenging recruiting environment where employee trust in the employer is ever 
decreasing.  
The critical reason for this comparison study is to identify what applicable policies 
the SOF and even the Army at large can learn from the civilian sector about different talent 
management techniques and strategies that solve the problem of innovative talent 
recruitment. While the upward trend of hiring of boomerangs is growing in the civilian 
business sector, the U.S. Army has not focused considerable resources on this effort. The 
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prior service recruitment policies of SOF as described in Chapter II follow the same 
guidelines as the regular Army. Basically, Soldiers that volunteer to separate from service 
can join the Army National Guard (ARNG), the United States Army Reserve (USAR), 
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) or the civilian/government sector.105 Soldiers of good 
standing have about a year to rejoin SOF after they have separated. If they choose to rejoin 
after that time, the amount of paperwork and waivers needed is staggering. Overall, there 
is not enough research into why prior service recruitment is a more viable option in a more 
fiscally constrained future, and this case study will help to fill in those gaps. In contrast to 
the military’s lengthy yet, standard policies, the civilian sector has a varied concoction of 
boomerang policies depending on where you work. This varied concoction is good because 
it allows their human resource managers maximum flexibility in a relatively short time so 
that issues in manning can be addressed instantaneously. The downside, though, is that 
often employees do not even know what policies their employer supports. Overall, SOF 
can learn a lot from diverse business sector policies that show how to best tap into the 
overlooked pool of potential boomerang soldiers. 
The objectives for this comparison study are to identify the pros and cons of hiring 
former employees in the business sector and analyze how these would compare to hiring 
former Soldiers. Additionally, the objective of analyzing how the business sector maintains 
alumni networks and open-door business cultures to enable rehiring of former employees 
is of interest. Lastly, this study seeks to offer recommendations to SOF on how traditional 
methods could be revised according to future dynamic strategies in the rehiring of former 
Soldiers.106 
A. HIRING FORMER EMPLOYEES 
There is much the military can learn from the business sectors changing philosophy 
on hiring former employees. Over the past decades the ex-employee stigma is slowly 
eroding with many civilian employers seeing the value added that these boomerang 
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individuals can bring back to their business. A Workforce Institute survey conducted by 
Kronos Inc. in 2015 revealed that out of 1,800 human resource (HR) professionals in the 
civilian sector over 76 percent said they are now much more open to hiring boomerangs 
than in the years prior.107 The report further stated that over 900 HR professionals 
commented that they believed their organization had actual policies against hiring 
boomerang employees. Additionally, the survey showed that this rising support for 
boomerangs was not only among civilian sector HR professionals. The acceptance of 
boomerangs was rising among companies and employees alike with over 40 percent of the 
workers surveyed saying they would possibly return to a previous employer even though 
only 15 percent of the workers had ever boomeranged. The boomerang trend among 
employees is growing not only because workers are more willing to work for prior 
employers but also because they are actually getting hired at a growing rate as well. Over 
85 percent of HR professionals received boomerang job applications in the last year and 
40 percent responded that their business hired over half of the boomerang employees who 
applied.108 With just over 50 percent of HR professionals and managers surveyed saying 
that they would give good standing boomerang employees a very high or high priority for 
rehire explains this increase in hiring boomerangs. Overall, boomerang hiring is becoming 
a competitive practice for companies to achieve the competitive edge in a tight employee 
market in hopes of mitigating growing skills gaps.109 A competive practice the military has 
yet to fully recognize and implement. 
In the book, The Boomerang Principle: Inspire Lifetime Loyalty from Your 
Employees from 2017, author Lee Caraher explains that many generational 
misunderstandings among workers and employers have developed over the years, adding 
further complexity to the many different viewpoints on boomerang employees. He explains 
further that though experiencing mixed feelings on boomerangs, most of America’s older 
generation business leadership still believe that they as leaders deserve the loyalty of their 
employees. This trend is changing however as the employee and employer relationship has 
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evolved to a more equal playing field. Employees in the twenty first century, and especially 
Millenials born between 1980–2000, no longer anticipate staying in the same job for 20 or 
30 years. Most parents of Millenials are from Generation X born between 1965–1981. 
These parents have heavily influenced their children to understand that 20–30 year 
retirement jobs are not as abundant as they once were and the liklihood of lasting that long 
in any job is doubtful. Additionally, it has been reported that 33 percent of Generation X 
employees would consider returning to their old employer while Millenials reported a 
substantial increase at 46 percent. This has often been attributed to Millenials leaving a job 
too soon because they were disappointed in the mundainess of work.110 Caraher states that 
this has led many to believe that newer generations are entitled and that no one is loyal 
anymore. However, this damaging narrative may be inaccurate for maybe Millienials 
merely trust their employers less and place a lesser amount of importance on tenure.111 
This trending perspective of lessening loyalty and entitled generations has slowly 
permeated throughout the military as well. Making many senior leaders averse to changes 
in policy that accommodate a less loyal or entitled generation of Soldiers.112 
Lee Caraher describes how Baby Boomers are those born between 1946–1964 and 
grew up in a reward system founded upon long tenure with an organization.113 He explains 
how over the years there has been an evolution of trust and loyalty as this system was 
continuously eroded. The economic tribulations of the 21st century have proven this erosion 
by the massive amount of job losses in the 2008 economic crash and the even more recent 
2020 COVID19 outbreak. Caraher states the loss of trust in employers by employees grew 
substantially after 2008 and ever since there has been an evolution of loyalty. The Great 
Recession of 2008, where almost 9 million people were laid off, heavily influenced Baby 
Boomers, Generation X, and particularly Millennials to be less trusting and less averse to 
the risks of job hopping. Though businesses still held the control of the paycheck, 
employees soon realized they were a valuable resource for a company. This realization led 
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many Millennials to no longer view an organization as the end state in their careers but 
rather as a steppingstone. With this change of mindset and ever faster digital age 
technology, companies soon valued accomplishing tasks efficiently over anything else. 
This focus on efficiency has led to businesses preferring high performance over long tenure 
among their employees. This more transactional relationship, simultaneously saves the 
business money in the form of less raises and benefits.114 The implementation of the 
blended Retirement system (BRS) and the age old up and out system seems to show that 
the military is trending toward this more transactional approach seen in the civilian sector. 
This trust and loyalty evolution has had profound impacts on the economy and on 
reshaping the American Dream. To obtain the good life of the American Dream, people 
have developed a new mindset of work hard and chart your own career path apart from 
only one organization, for one should not count on them to always reward one’s hard 
work.115 The period of change truly started in the 1980s after businesses started to 
redetermine the right size of their organization and began firing huge numbers of 
employees in order to attain better margins and increased investor returns.116 Caraher goes 
on to clarify that this trend has only increased in the past 40 years as corporate interests 
focus on short term profit goals rather than the long-term care of their employees. In 2017 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that a typical employee remained at their job for 
4.2 years in contrast to 4.6 years in 2014. An even lower trend was displayed in 2014 by 
Millennials from the 25–34 age group who had an average of only three years at any one 
job.117 Needless, to say job hopping is a growing trend and is expected to grow further with 
Generation Z which was born between 2001–2019. Employers and the Army should learn 
how to mitigate the negative aspects of job hopping and embrace the positive aspects, such 
as boomerang employment opportunities. The recent exponential growth of the contract 
economy and job hopping has been largely enabled through various internet job platforms 
like LinkedIn, GlassDoor and ClearanceJobs, platforms which instantaneously match the 
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skills of employees to employers. Caraher asserts that this job finding technology alone has 
been a major contributor to waning loyalty trends and shows that the current definition of 
loyalty to an organization is flawed. Caraher concludes that organizations should redefine 
loyalty not in terms of a long employment tenure but rather as a lifetime of allegiance 
irrespective of employment status. Their capability to entice, retain and gain the lifetime 
loyalty of the most talented workers is becoming one of the most important aspects for a 
sustainable business model no matter the size of the organization.118 The Army, like 
businesses should understand that establishing a culture that accepts boomerang return 
creates a culture to stay for and a culture of value.119 
B. MERITS OF HIRING PREVIOUS EMPLOYEES 
In the journal article “Employees on the rebound: Extending the careers literature 
to include boomerang employment” from 2017, author Brian Swider explains that in the 
past, hiring boomerang employees was restricted. Hiring boomerangs was restricted in 
order to address immediate needs in relatively lower skilled labor such as farm workers or 
retail employees with allowances made for extremely high-tech fields like aerospace 
engineering and corporate finance. He describes that as employee occupations have 
changed from linear trajectories constricted inside one business to more dynamic and 
boundaryless paths, there is increased competition for talented individuals. In 2017 it was 
estimated that up to 20 percent of new hires were boomerangs and that percentage is only 
expected to increase in the years to come.120 Therefore, to truly understand the merits of 
hiring previous employees one must thoroughly analyze what boomerang employees have 
to offer an organization. 
1. Five Major Reasons to Rehire Former Employees  
• Cost-effective: Boomerang employees already know the ins and outs of 
the organization and reduce integration and training costs considerably. 
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They have the highest returns on recruiting investment with greatly 
reduced costs on training and onboarding. The large professional 
accounting firm Deloitte reported that in one year it saved $3.8 million in 
search fees when it decided to hire more boomerang employees. On 
average a rehired individual costs the employer only 33 percent the cost of 
hiring a new employee.121  
• Known quantity: A boomerang employees fit in the organization is not a 
guess, it is based on past performance and interim organization 
performance. In the Kronos 2015 survey 38 percent of managers said that 
familiarity of an organization’s culture was the largest reason to hire past 
employees.122 Additionally, a 2008 study revealed that many new job 
applicants are not sure what a new job position integrally entails or what 
knowledge, skills, and abilities they will need to be a top performer.123 
• New Vision: Boomerang employees bring back fresh perspective and new 
ideas that can strengthen and revitalize operations that have become 
stagnant or inefficient. They also bring with them social capital derived 
from interim employment relationships that can ensure interorganizational 
actions are more efficient.124 
• New Skills: Improved since the last time they worked for the organization 
the Boomerang employee brings back their original human capital as well 
as knowledge and lessons learned from outside the organization. These 
new skills will help defeat ineffective stovepipe mentalities.125 
 
121 Kumavat, “Boomerang of Employees: ‘The Strategic Way of Filling the Organizational Talent 
Gap,’” 14. 
122 Florentine, “7 Reasons to Hire Back the Right Former Employees,” 2. 
123 Kumavat, “Boomerang of Employees: ‘The Strategic Way of Filling the Organizational Talent 
Gap,’” 14. 
124 Somaya and Williamson, “Rethinking the ‘War for Talent,’” 30. 
125 Westfall, “The Pros & Cons of Rehiring Former Employees | Glassdoor for Employers,” 1. 
38 
• Morale Boost: Boomerang employees also serve to inform others that they 
have a good thing going, increasing the positive image of the organization. 
Bringing back alumni as employees fosters a greater sense of community 
that is empirically proven to increase retention rates and the positive 
reputation of an organization.126 Additionally, there is often a chain 
reaction trend that occurs in which bringing back one alumni usually 
results in the return of multiple alumni. Lastly, studies have shown that 
returning to a different leader has no discernable effect on a boomerang’s 
morale or performance levels.127  
In the journal article “Gone Today but here Tomorrow: Extending the Unfolding 
Model of Turnover to Consider Boomerang Employees” from 2017, the authors Shipp, 
Furst, Harris and Rosen explain that there are many merits of the boomerang philosophy. 
They point out that businesses can take advantage of this philosophy in their endless search 
for the most talented individuals to increase productivity and bring new ideas to the 
workplace. The war for talent has increased over the years and losing that talent is 
detrimental to productivity. They show that there is growing empirical evidence that 
confirms a company with a high turnover rate correlates to lower firm performance due to 
shortfalls in social capital and the high cost of restoring lost employees.128 Thus, it is 
imperative to give employees a reason to not leave. Nevertheless, the fact is that there are 
countless reasons why someone may voluntarily or involuntarily leave their place of 
employment. Therefore, the best way in which an employer can mitigate negative 
perceptions on separation and negative impacts on organizational performance is to give 
an employee justification to return. Respect, trust, security, pension, pay, family benefits 
and opportunities to excel are but a few reasons for someone to return to their old 
employer.129  
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In a published 2015 article titled “7 reasons to hire back the right former 
employees,” the author Sharon Florentine explains that many businesses fall short in 
having an effective boomerang strategy in place. She references the 2015 Kronos survey 
which revealed that 80 percent of employees surveyed responded that where they work 
does not have a publicized strategy to incentivize returning. Another 64 percent of workers 
responded that there is also no strategy for maintaining communication after leaving.130 
The failure of these businesses to publicize their boomerang strategy or keep a relationship 
with past employees is a lost advantage in an ever-tighter market for talent.  
A journal article published in 2017 titled “The effects of heart count on employees’ 
perception on separation,” the authors Wen, Muthuveloo and Ping challenge the 
philosophy of head count over heart count. Head count is concerned with numbers of 
employees and productivity, while heart count is concerned about employee psychological 
mindsets. Heart count seeks to nurture the loyalty, motivation, belonging and appreciation 
of employees in an effort to reframe employment as a long term investment. With an open 
door policy for boomerang employees the article stated that the proactive heart count 
philosophy can not only bring back great talent but also increases overall employee 
satisfaction and productivty.131  
In his book, “The boomerang principle: inspire lifetime loyalty from your 
employees” Lee Caraher coins the term “boomerang principle.” According to Caraher in 
many ways like the heart count philosophy the “boomerang principle” is a mindset for 
organizations that believe in allowing and inspiring past employees to return. He states that 
the faster organizations accept the “boomerang principle” and modify their recruitment 
strategy for the long game of loyalty, the more strategic advantage they will gain over those 
that do not. Caraher also notes that an open-door policy is a business mentality that pays 
dividends with some assessments revealing that the typical Fortune 500 company may well 
save $12 million annually if boomerang employees were readily recruited and hired.132 The 
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boomerang principle permeates policies and an organization’s culture, therefore, serving 
to retain great employees in businesses longer than they had planned, while simultaneously 
producing both efficiency and profit.133 A recent study revealed that career growth among 
rehired employees is usually on a faster track than a career track of those who pursue an 
uninterrupted job at one business. Lastly, research shows that boomerangs have greater 
levels of trust, work ethic and retention rates than individuals that are newly hired, after all 
they decided to come back.134  
C. DEMERITS OF HIRING PREVIOUS EMPLOYEES 
In the journal article “Employees on the rebound: Extending the careers literature 
to include boomerang employment,” from 2017, the authors Swider, Liu, Harris and 
Gardner point out that though there are many perks to hiring past employee’s there is a 
dark side to this strategy with many caveats that need exploration. First, they state that 
organizations must realize that not all prior employees are equal and ought to therefore 
develop a system that distinguishes favorable and unfavorable applicants. Second, an 
organization should realize that prior performance and interim performance matters. There 
are few cases where a mediocre performer will return as a high performer. What a past 
employee has done in their absence matters since it will show if their personal and 
professional development have improved or remained stagnant. Lastly, they explain that 
the reason why they left their employer in the first place matters, as almost all involuntary 
separations should not be pursued for rehiring.135 Whether an employee left voluntarily 
due to a toxic leader, traumatic event, birth of a child, spousal relocation, divorce, 
competing job offer, reassignment or even due to reorganization they must each be 
considered different and vital to contemplate. These are all potent predictors of 
performance and must be analyzed to ensure the benefits of hiring a boomerang employee 
are going to be fruitful.136 
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1. Five Major Reasons NOT to Rehire Former Employees  
• Toxic Personality: Though talent comes in many forms there are 
individuals who are very talented but do not make good team players. In 
fact, these toxic individuals degrade the effectiveness of an organization 
and were probably never missed after they left.137  
• Inability to Change: A former employee may have been a top performer 
in the past, but likely existing processes, systems and procedures have 
changed while they were absent.138 Therefore, the individual may be too 
stubborn to change and such individuals will not add to the workplace but 
only serve to hinder the progression of the organization.  
• Best Candidate: Recruiting a boomerang is cheaper and a known quantity 
compared to searching the vast labor market. However, just because 
recruiting a boomerang is cheaper and easier does not mean they are the 
best candidate for the job. Additionally, employers must be aware of 
boomerang applicants who apply out of desperation, as this should be a 
warning sign they may not perform as expected.139  
• Entitled: A returning employee may feel entitled to better treatment or 
other perks since they are likely higher in tenure than most of their 
surrounding employees. This is an issue that must be considered, 
especially if they come back in a higher position. This may encourage 
others to view leaving as a great method of climbing the corporate ladder 
and create negative feelings or underappreciation among other employees 
who never left. Lastly, hiring large numbers of past employees can make 
an organization look desperate.  
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• Resentments: There is always the possibility that a rehired boomerang 
employee holds resentment against an old boss, past workers, or a certain 
policy. If there is such a history then rehiring this employee needs further 
analysis as grudges can tear apart an efficient workplace.140  
There are many reasons not to rehire boomerang employees but with mitigation and 
careful analysis most of these pitfalls can be avoided. Other things that must be considered 
however, is that many of the positive sides of hiring boomerangs have negative sides as 
well. A known paradoxical situation is that most boomerangs are statistically proven to be 
a very low turnover risk the second time around compared to new employees. However, 
this also means that most boomerangs and especially boomerang Soldiers expect to retire 
from their newly acquired job.141 Thus, the bad side of boomerangs is that the military 
would have to pay their retirement and get less service time since they will already have 
between 5–10 years of service. Additionally, passive talent poached from competitors in 
the form of a boomerang employee can hurt inter-business relationships.142 There is always 
the fact that boomerang employees take the position of a new hire that has never worked 
for the organization and thus there is lost potential talent in the form of a new innovative 
perspective.143 In the journal article “A Study On Boomerang Employees And Talent 
Retention,” from 2020, the author Amulya Kurian explains that accepting the boomerang 
principle haphazardly can also lead to a revolving door where many employees quit to try 
new job offers only to easily return a few months later. Lastly, the author states that the 
question of loyalty needs to be considered. If the employee left once, they may leave again 
and therefore it must be noted if this potential rehire is chronically dissatisfied or has an 
excessive job-hopping tendency.144 For Soldiers, the Army’s service obligation system for 
reentry would solve this issue. Overall, there are many reasons to not hire prior employees, 
but most concerns can be mitigated with thorough interviews and analysis that is coupled 
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with a sound boomerang implementation strategy that ensures rehiring of cultural misfits 
does not happen. 
D. VALUE OF ALUMNI NETWORKS 
In a 2015 workplace trends survey, 80 percent of workers said that former 
employers severed all contact after they left and never reached out for them to return.145 
Since then there has been a greater analysis of the boomerang principle by organizations 
who are starting to see the value behind maintaining communication and bonds between 
employer and employee. In a 2018 article titled “Why Companies Should Stay Connected 
with Ex-Employees” the author Geri Tucker points out that legal, accounting and 
consulting firms like Deloitte, Citigroup and JPMorgan have led the way by creating 
diverse alumni networks of former employees. With over 20 percent of America’s 
employees changing jobs each year these businesses have showed great success at 
managing nurturing networks of former employees and getting them back as 
boomerangs.146  Due to this success and the growing job hopping trend, these big business’ 
policies are being copied by other big businesses like Microsoft, Dell, SAP, Booz Allen 
Hamilton and Shell Oil Company.147 
The value of alumni is not well utilized in the military, as alumni are perceived as 
a lost asset soon as they separate from service. This negative mindset devalues alumni for 
just like in the civilian sector alumni from the military can also assist with brand advocacy, 
mentorship, development guidance and talent acquisition.148 Geri Tucker’s article goes on 
to explain that Deloitte is a great example of what successes can be achieved with an 
advanced alumni program. Created in 2000 the Deloitte alumni network has over 200,000 
U.S. members. In 2017 Deloitte had over 2,800 boomerang employees return to work for 
Deloitte which was a 32 percent increase over the past year. The company attributed this 
increase mostly to their advanced centralized alumni program. Though the military has 
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numerous decentralized and informal Reddit pages, Facebook pages, Twitter pages and a 
many other unofficial alumni SOF networks, these are a far cry from a truly advanced 
formal alumni program solely formalized by the organization itself. Leveraging existing 
decentralized SOF alumni networks for recruitment purposes would never be as successful 
as a central alumni network formalized by SOF. The existing alumni networks have mostly 
been organized from the bottom up and serve limited purposes for informing, connecting, 
and finding people. However, the mere existence of these informalized online alumni 
networks shows there is interest and a need. 
Geri Tuckers article points out that Deloitte’s advanced alumni program keeps ex-
employees updated on the company and job openings without overwhelming them with 
information. The cost of the alumni program has grown, but it started out at around $50,000 
and still found cost efficient ways to connect alumni and deliver value. Deloitte ensures 
the alumni program is briefed while onboarding and not just when employees leave. They 
keep the page updated, conduct surveys, and ensure to send out reminders with every 
newsletter to update alumni contact information. Just like the military, Deloitte places high 
priority on alumni referrals. Additionally, Deloitte modestly awards former employees 
when they refer new hires that get the job. They track metrics and use of the site and have 
alumni networking events while using the alumni website to offer gifts and rewards.149 A 
lesson the Army can learn is that organizations with strong interconnected alumni networks 
have discovered that staying in touch with ex-employees creates an enormous opportunity 
to retain relationships and their goodwill, while, in turn, creating a vast network for 
potential recruiting applications.150 In this digital age the Army has failed to realize that a 
growing number of former Soldiers are open to more involvement. The Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, unofficial decentralized alumni networks and informal military based social media 
pages are trying to fill the current gap created by the digital age but there is much more that 
could be done. Military alumni just like current business sector alumni will be outspoken 
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advocates, referral partners, contractors, mentors and ultimately employees for a second 
tour of duty.151  
The Army recognizes that being in the military becomes part of a Soldiers lifelong 
identity, but they fail to see that brand advocacy is not just a business term. Speaking well 
of the U.S. military and its culture cannot be emphasized enough. Geri Tuckers article 
expands upon this when he references a recent study done by the online recruiting site, 
Glassdoor. The business estimated that almost 50 percent of the individuals who write on 
the site are former employees and tend to write more negative reviews of their former 
company. However, the Glassdoor study also showed that out of the millions of companies 
listed on their sites the businesses with formal alumni programs received far more favorable 
reviews from past employees than businesses without a formal alumni program.152 
Employee and Soldier mobility does not have to be a win or lose battle. Just like in the 
civilian sector the military may lose the human capital of their former Soldiers, but they 
can still retain those Soldiers’ social capital through an alumni network. Overall, stable 
communication through an advanced alumni program builds a sense of organizational 
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IV. MILITARY SERVICES HIRING BOOMERANGS 
A. MILITARY AVERSION TO RECRUITING BOOMERANGS 
The Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force all have similarly non accommodating 
and rigid policies when it comes to allowing former service members to rejoin. As 
discussed in Chapter III, there are many demerits in hiring former employees and all of 
them are applicable to rehiring former Soldiers. However, there are additional underlying 
reasons why the military does not actively target former Soldiers for rehire. Part of the 
reasoning is that hiring boomerangs can be biased and political as many senior leaders in 
the military and business world still hold the antiquated belief that boomerangs are not 
loyal and do not deserve the effort to be targeted for recruitment since they themselves 
never left.154 This is detrimental to positive change since the job realm has shifted with the 
dwindling number of individuals staying loyal to one organization for life. Furthermore, 
just because an individual does not leave does not mean they are loyal; they could simply 
have no other viable alternative.  
Another argument against boomerang policy enactment is that the individuals who 
left service are all poor performers. An HRC SF survey of 153 Special Forces Captains in 
2019 indicated that the common belief that boomerangs would only be recruitment of low 
performers is not substantially valid. The survey indicated that 47% of them would most 
likely depart the military prior to serving in senior leadership positions, and 84% stated 
that they believed the Regiment was not retaining the highest-quality Captains for future 
service.155 In another HRC research article, separations of SF officers was addressed by 
pointing out that the highest performing “Ahead of Peers” files separated more often than 
“Slightly Ahead of Peers files.” Additionally, low performing “With Peers and Slightly 
Behind Peers” files separated only slightly more often than “Ahead of Peers” personnel.”156 
Adding further insight into this argument is the commonly held belief among the majority 
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of officers that often Officer Evaluation Reports and structures do not effectively measure 
or make use of talent. Figure 3 shows that over 84% of the 153 SF captains agree that the 
SF Regiment is failing to retain highest quality peers for future service.  
 
Displays a 2019 HRC SF survey question of 153 Special Forces Captains.  
Figure 3. FY 2019 HRC SF Survey157 
Another argument against enacting a boomerang policy for SOF is “that if it’s not 
broke don’t fix it.” Bonuses and other enticing measures are adequately meeting the 
requirements of SOF retention and recruiting but only for the time being and the fiscal cost 
is high.158 The article “Army Talent Management Reform: The Culture Problem” from 
2019, by authors Wong and Gerras explains that changing the system makes senior leaders 
face the issue that the system in which they prospered is flawed and needs improvement. 
Thus, their response is to categorize a change such as enacting a boomerang policy as 
merely a corporate fad which risks harming an adequate personnel system. Moreover, 
enacting a boomerang policy for only SOF goes against the egalitarian culture of the Army. 
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The Army is by its nature an inclusive culture that strives to treat all equally and is averse 
to policies that extend special measures for only highly talented individuals.159 
Another issue is the up and out system of the military that promotes talent linearly 
by year group and does not allow many exceptions for lateral re-entry. Furthermore, 
military services do not target and recruit former service members to come back in. That 
is, unless it is through the narrow scope of emergency mechanisms like the CAD program 
or the limited Prior Service Level Officer (PS LO) program offered by the Airforce. PS LO 
allows a select number of separated active duty Airforce officers to return by Direct Duty 
Accession (DDA). The Airforce has a similar Prior Service (PS) program for enlisted ranks 
as well and both programs require applicants to be under the age of 39, open to possible 
retrain or reclass and must have exited with an honorable discharge.160 Limited to 50 
applicants per program in 2014 the Airforce annually adjusts quota’s based on needs of the 
Airforce from 250–50 slots a year. It takes four to six months for applicants to be processed 
and applicants may have to wait a year if retrain or reclass is necessary.161 Nevertheless, 
as with all military services there is no targeted active recruiting measures that takes place 
once a service member separates. 
B. COSTS OF A BOOMERANG SOF SOLDIER 
The cost of producing a SOF Officer and a SOF non-commissioned officer are 
varied and complex. Unlike the Airforce that asked RAND to analyze the cost of a pilot 
for each of its airframes and came up with $1.1 million for a C-17 pilot to $10.9 million 
for an F-22 pilot there has been no in depth recent study for SOF.162 Additionally, the study 
looked at the relative cost-effectiveness of retaining versus accessing Air force pilots and 
determined that expanding the pilot training pipeline is more costly. Thus, increasing pilot 
retention and incurring higher special and incentive (S&I) pay costs, as well as the higher 
personnel cost of a more senior force are still cheaper in the long run. Proving that retaining 
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pilots is more efficient than training hordes of new ones to offset attrition just goes to show 
that training personnel is costly and makes retention of them fiscally necessary. 
Unfortunately, the study failed to examine the costs of boomerang pilots and how such 
recruitment could alleviate the massive funds needed for retention.  
Unlike Airforce pilots that train to operate one highly complex airframe; CA, PO 
and SF personnel are extremely varied in their skills, specialties, and training. This is 
especially true for SF Green Berets who are specifically trained to be jacks of all trades. 
Since an SF Green Beret operator is a member of a team, they are expected to have multiple 
special skill sets from linguists who are explosive ordnance specialists to medics that are 
also satellite radio operators. With such varied mixes of training it is virtually impossible 
to determine the exact cost of SOF personnel and especially an SF operative. In 2017, 
former Special Forces officer and writer General Howard stated that it “now it costs closer 
to $1.5 million” to train an SF operative and “you don’t waste that asset.”163 Thus, what 
policy makers must ask themselves is whether not targeting former SOF for re-hiring is 
wasting that asset? 
C. TOTAL TIME OF TRAINING FOR A SOF OFFICER 
Using both qualitative and quantitative data provided from both Human Resources 
Command (HRC) and Headquarters Department Army G1 (HQDA G1) we performed a 
total Time of Training comparative analysis. The comparative analysis seeks to show the 
relationships between total Time of Training (TOT) of conventional Infantry officers and 
TOT of SOF officers. When total TOT of a SOF Officer is compared to that of the average 
TOT of a combat arms Infantry (IN) Officer, analysis indicates a higher amount of training 
for SOF Officers. In this analysis we are not arguing that the Army should retain SOF 
officers just because a lot of money was spent on their training. Instead we are arguing that 
the Army should retain SOF personnel through the boomerang program because it avoids 
the future high costs of shortening promotion timelines and the monetary increases needed 
for training SOF Officer replacements. Additionally, when the TOT is combined with the 
course attrition rates of conventional combat arms and SOF, data indicates higher selective 
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requirements for SOF. Moreover, attrition rates of the two groups indicate a higher attrition 
of SOF Officers when compared to the total conventional force. Thus, it is harder to 
become a SOF officer than an infantry officer due to both attrition rates and higher amounts 
of selective training. The TOT chart in Figure 4 indicates the resources invested in TOT is 
highest with SF officers at an average of 97 weeks, PO officers with 81 weeks, CA officers 
with 76 weeks and last is IN officers at an average of 68 weeks of training. 
 
Shows average cost in Time of Training (TOT) compared to other officer specialties. 
Figure 4. Time of Training (TOT) for Different Officer Specialties 
Our results showed that SF officers have an average of 30% more training than IN 
Officers. Results for PO have an average of 18% and CA have 12% more TOT in 
comparison to IN officers. In sum the SOF community has an average of 20% more total 
TOT. Additionally, it must be noted that numerous schools where less than 10% of the 
branch population attended were not included in the TOT due their minor significance on 
overall results since all branches would see a similarly small increase in weeks trained. The 
results from the analyzed data help prove our assumptions that average SOF officers have 
a higher cost in TOT than that of an average IN officer. Additionally, human domain factors 
have unequal variances between SOF officers and an IN officer since operational tempo, 
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family, outside employment opportunities, education, financial stability, and career 
projection differ in many aspects. Lastly, the Total Officer Personnel Management 
Information System (TOPMIS) data pull for TOT is dependent on how accurate Officer 
Record Briefs (ORB) have been updated as officers who are not up for promotion usually 
do not update their ORB to reflect training completed 
Data used for this model was pulled from the U.S. Army personnel management 
data base and TOPMIS data base. The sample size of SF CPTs we were able to pull data 
for was 954 out of 1017 SF CPT’s, 587 out of 646 CA CPTs, 267 out 293 PO CPTs and 
1753 out 1918 IN CPTs. The data used for the two independent variables TOT and course 
attrition rates reflected officer year groups, 2012–2015. This data only reflects quantifiable 
measurements of only two variables, further research into average time in dwell time, 
combat time, and number of dependents would best be used for a refined approach to this 
model. Measurement of the human domain for these year groups, and Captains Career 
Course (CCC) length was near impossible due to the lack of data available for all branches 
measured. Additionally, data extracted from TOPMIS may not have reflected precision 
measurements of each individual officer if their ORB was not updated and was therefore 
limited. Moreover, the branch qualification codes for courses and their lengths often 
changed throughout the given years which further restricted accurate data analysis.  
It is assumed that those who pass the strenuous course requirements of SOF, 
particularly SF, have a more qualitative assumption of cost into their career. Concluding 
data analysis, the overall impact of TOT was corroborated by Rand Research that came up 
with similar SF TOT results.164  Overall, the data shows conclusively that more time and 
therefore resources are put into the training of SOF officers than in a regular combat 
infantry branch officer, mostly attributable to the many required months of the three 
lengthy qualification courses for each branch.165 Though further study and data collection 
are required to meet the relevance needed for legislative and policy changes in recruitment 
and retention of the SOF community. This data analysis shows that SOF officers are 
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costlier and more time intensive to create than most other officer branches. Therefore, 
recruiting former SOF personnel back into service has high future value and is worth 
pursuing. 
D. BOOMERANG SELECTION AND BUILDING THE SYSTEM 
To build a boomerang Soldier system that could be enacted as policy does not 
require congressional approval. What would be required is a decision at the upper echelons 
of military leadership since a boomerang policy approval would go through the same 
approval as programs like CAD, CIP, and Brevet. The tools and framework needed for 
boomerang policy implementation are already available, except for the centralized alumni 
network. Currently there are tools and systems the Army has in place that could help 
recruiters decide what boomerangs should be rehired. One tool is the Recruit Market 
Information System (RMIS), used by recruiters that shows a Soldiers Prior Service Military 
Address File (PSMAF) that identifies individuals who have separated from the Active and 
Reserve Components within the last three years and are considered open for recruiting. 
These potential boomerang Soldiers are categorized as not receiving retired pay, not 
currently in a Reserve Component and exited with a general or honorable discharge. With 
such tools and systems in place the activation of boomerang recruiting policies could begin 
in only a short period of time. Additionally, these tools are advancing even further in their 
capabilities as they become linked to other initiatives like the update to the DD Form 214. 
The update to DD Form 214 service member separation will ensure data is accurate and 
accessible by veterans and other government agencies electronically. This is an excellent 
step as this form is well-established and remains the authoritative document to verify 
veteran status.166 The updating of DD Form 214 allows better information to encompass a 
boomerang rehire and would be absolutely crucial to creating a better system in which to 
rehire former soldiers. The new form will enhance the focus on the section “separation 
information” which is pivotal for determining whether someone should be let back in for 
service. Recruiters would be able to use a database of these forms to determine the actual 
size of the boomerang soldier recruitment pool. Furthermore, the Army has enacted the 
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Department of the Army Career Engagement Survey (DACES) which focuses on retention. 
This more detailed survey tool not only asks service members why they leave service but 
also asks randomly selected service members why they continue their honorable service.167 
Advancements in surveying tools and DD Form 214 documentation efforts will be pivotal 
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V. EFFECTS OF THE BLENDED RETIREMENT SYSTEM  
In a 2019 RAND research report titled “Setting Military Compensation to Support 
Recruitment, Retention, and Performance,” the author Beth Asch explains how military 
compensation through pay and retirement is the most straightforward way in which the 
country identifies and reimburses Soldiers for their military service. The report goes on to 
say that unlike compensation in the civilian sector, the role of military compensation and 
retirement is as a strategic human resource tool.168 In short, military retirement pay is an 
earned reward as well as an incentive for Soldiers to end their service. Civilian businesses 
do not have lateral entry constraints like the military, which must train from the bottom up 
and thus is not overly concerned with older employee turnover. The military needs older 
employee turnover to ensure promotion opportunities for younger employees. Thus, 
military retirement pay is mainly a tool to manage the flow of personnel rather than the 
civilian sectors version of a tax-sheltered savings plan.169 Realizing that military retirement 
pay is mainly used as a separation function is often lost on policy makers and politicians 
who have often recommended the military copy the civilian sector model. However, a 
civilian sector model of no benefits until age 60, except for those few Soldiers who finish 
a 30-year career, has been statistically shown to radically decrease retention rates to 
unsustainable levels. To counteract such a decrease active duty pay would have to 
substantially increase and involuntary separation would become a widespread practice so 
as to control personnel numbers.170 Therefore, a strictly civilian modeled retirement plan 
for the military would prove unsuccessful in many areas and that is why the new system is 
a hybrid of both the old legacy system and facets of the civilian retirement model. 
A. BRS BACKGROUND 
The Blended Retirement System (BRS) was created in 2016 and enacted for all new 
accessions after January 1, 2018. Beth Asch’s report describes how BRS serves as the 
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replacement to the legacy retirement system that was created at the end of WWII. The BRS 
was created mainly due to the high costs of the legacy system even though it had 
continuously met the needs of the military for over 70 years. The report points out that 
opponents of the legacy system said that the excessive cost was unjust to taxpayers, as most 
active duty military personnel exit service at 45 years old. Exiting with a military retirement 
paycheck and usually gaining another retirement paycheck 20 years later in the government 
or civilian sector was an inequity since civilian taxpayers retire around 62–64 years old 
with only one retirement paycheck. Second, the legacy system was unfair to 87 percent of 
military personnel that served fewer than 20 years with no retirement check. Additionally, 
critics argued that the old system was inefficient while a new system like the BRS could 
alter compensation from the end of a career to earlier in a career which would still give the 
military the young recruits needed at substantially less cost. Lastly, opponents of the legacy 
system argued that it was inflexible and offered only one way to leave the military with 
any real benefits and compensation.171 With BRS the DoD estimated that over 80 percent 
of active duty military would exit the service with a retirement benefit, while under the 
legacy system less than 20 percent leave with retirement benefits.172  
The BRS still includes the defined benefit (DB) from the legacy system but at a 2.0 
percent DB multiplier instead of the past 2.5 DB multiplier. It also adds two new elements 
known as a defined contribution plan (DC), which include the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) 
and continuation pay (CP). TSP provides a guaranteed contribution for service members 
and match’s up to 5 percent of contributions. This retirement benefit becomes vested after 
two years in service to ensure service members departing the military leave with some 
compensation before the 20 years needed under the legacy system. CP acts as a retention 
incentive much like a bonus that is rewarded to midcareer members who sign an additional 
service obligation. The key purpose of the CP is to give a retention incentive among service 
members in their midcareer who will have the decreased 2.0 DB multiplier.173 Offsetting 
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these costs of TSP and CP are savings to the government due to lower long-term DB 
payouts.174 
B. BRS ISSUES 
The BRS hybrid system solves many issues of the legacy system with the largest 
being a less costly retirement system. However, there are potentially unforeseen issues with 
retention that the BRS has yet to experience and may be ill equipped to overcome. BRS 
offers current versus deferred compensation and thus the incentive to leave the service early 
presents a clear issue. Policy makers believe the CP at midcareer point will solve this issue 
and though reduced to 2.0 percent it still offers a great incentive to stay. However, BRS 
research fails to consider the increasing trend of job-hopping Millennials, and the 
expectation that Generation Z will further increase this trend in the years to come. They 
are mostly basing their assumptions on past Baby Boomers and Generation X since almost 
all individuals who created BRS fall into these generations. Additionally, there is a rising 
trend in costly disability pay with 41 percent of servicemembers serving after 2001 
receiving disability pay in comparison to 25 percent in past eras. With the medical 
acceptance of traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
disability payouts will continue to be a growing fiscal issue in the years ahead as combat 
veterans continue to exit service and retire.175 Additionally, a future regional conflict like 
Iraq or Afghanistan could serve to increase disability payouts exponentially when coupled 
with BRS and the assurance that service members do not leave service with no 
compensation. With some type of compensation and a lower deferred retirement paycheck 
the newer generation will no longer leave military service early with no compensation, and 
therefore there is even less incentive to stay.  
Recent research has shown that there is mounting evidence that younger service 
members fail to take advantage of the TSP to its fullest extent and struggle to fully 
comprehend the new retirement system; only truly realizing that their retirement paycheck 
at 20 years of service is now less. Additionally, the CP (which is suggested to be about one 
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years’ worth of an officers pay) is offered at 8–12 years of service and for many this may 
be too late in their career to be a large incentive.176 There is the possibility that substantial 
amounts of service members will exit before the 8–12 year mark, especially because the 
TSP cannot even be claimed until they are 59.5 years old. Also, it has been shown that first 
term service members are more likely to end their service than careerists and that a pay 
increase for first term personnel will not produce extra performance. Thus, the pay for 
service members will continue to be low in the beginning of their career and then raise 
substantially by longevity as well as by rank.177 This system may work but it will face 
difficulties with the newer generations that see the benefits of job hopping in the civilian 
world. In the civilian realm low pay only further incentivizes employee job hopping. Thus, 
for service members to get out rather than wait years to receive a good paycheck could 
present a significant retention issue.  
This retention issue is a definite possibility if the economy is strong, as Soldiers 
could leave with some deferred compensation in the form of the TSP and often some form 
of continuous military disability payment. To compensate for this the military predicts it 
may have to significantly increase CP pay to meet retention numbers as well as additional 
S&I pay to sustain officer retention.178 This enormous CP and S&I pay increases may make 
the BRS just as costly as the legacy system and depending on the state of the military 
budget and the economy such financial increases may even be infeasible. Nevertheless, the 
CP might be too late for many service members who get out in their 5–7 years of service 
timeframe when they are most marketable to the civilian sector as young talent. Due to this 
unresolved future issue the military and especially SOF may need to delve into the benefits 
of hiring boomerang Soldiers. Rehiring prior service members after 1–5 years of break in 
service may not only be a viable alternative to enormous CP increases but a more fiscally 
responsible option altogether.  
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VI. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
Due to the extreme physical and mental requirements for SFAS and SFQC, it is no 
doubt SF officers are of a higher caliber and are few and far between. According to a report 
released by Special Operations Command in 2017, the Special Forces Assessment and 
Selection (SFAS) in conjunction with Special Forces Qualification course (SFQC) has 
among the highest attrition rates in comparison to the sister services of SOF. According to 
the report, SFAS has 64% attrition for enlisted and 51% for officers. Those who pass SFAS 
must make it past SFQC which has an attrition rate of 35% for enlisted and 21% for 
officers. In contrast the Infantry Officer Basic Course (IOBC) had a 71% graduation rate 
average for the years 2012–2015.  
The product produced by SFAS and SFQC (not to mention the additional training) 
is a unique and superior soldier with special skill sets that is incomparable to conventional 
forces, let alone immeasurable. Putting a monetary price on such a product is even more 
difficult. Estimates for a single SF qualified soldier range from a million dollars to two 
million dollars when only accounting for individual soldier pay, equipment, logistics, and 
staffing. Calculating the total sum is extremely difficult due to the varying accounts of 
logistics and benefits paid to each touch point. However, accounting for time of training 
(TOT) and specific qualifications are far simpler and comprehendible. When using this 
method, one can clearly visualize the separation between the conventional Soldier and the 
Soldiers in SOF.  
Plagued with manning shortages and a high operational tempo, talent managers for 
SF are further restrained with the dated up-or-out system. The current shortfall for active 
component officers and senior enlisted is compounded with the requirement to fulfill billets 
in conventional headquarters with SF officers. This requirement will further constrain the 
regiment’s talent bench for battalion commanders, substituting competitive positions with 
available personnel rather than quality. Adding to this predicament is that SF branch talent 
managers assess that there will be significant shortages of post Intermediate Level 
Education (ILE) for at least five years.  
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SOF loses human capital in the form of organizational knowledge, specialized skills 
and military knowhow when a service member exits the service.179 Retaining Soldiers in 
the military is a hard and difficult war for talent that cannot always be won in the first 
battle. However, it can be won in the second battle if the employee can return. The 
boomerang principle and heart count philosophy offer a clear policy outline on how skill 
inventories can be increased and maintained by enticing rehiring policies for returning 
Soldiers. The demerits and merits of hiring past employees offer a clear correlation for 
military application as they primarily deal with the inner aspects of human employment 
that are majorly universal. The American dream is changing, and young Americans are 
showing increasing trends toward job hopping which will only grow in the years to come. 
Though Army recruits have trust and loyalty engrained in them they are in constant contact 
with the civilian world and even though they may not be used to job hopping, they will not 
be impervious to its trending cultural effects. Current programs focus on recruiting within 
the reserves and only weaken those elements in the long term while the boomerang policy 
would recruit from the civilian sector just as the business sectors recruit from the military. 
This policy just reverses the cycle. The Army’s lack of recruitment of former Soldiers is 
an untapped talent pool and there is exceptional financial and organizational value for those 
that proactively pursue boomerang employees rather than passively waiting for them to 
initiate a return.  
Regarding BRS effects the military could use cost effective techniques like the CP 
and TSP to minimize attrition rates. Yet, they may not be enticing enough for the military 
to meet qualitative and quantitative goals in retention or recruiting if Soldiers follow the 
same job-hopping trends as displayed in the civilian sector. Though economic effects on 
boomerang recruitment are inconclusive, research shows that prior service recruitment of 
Soldiers is a more viable option in a more fiscally constrained future. Overall, a heavily 
emphasized Army boomerang program is an innovative talent retention mechanism that 
creates a culture to stay for and a culture of value.180 A program that the civilian sector is 
capitalizing on is one that the Army should capitalize on as well. 
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. SOF MANNING ISSUE 
In comparison to the Army Competitive category (ACC), the SF Branch have a 
much more significant attrition rate from the force. Based on surveys conducted over the 
past five years, the attrition rates of the ACC, equate to an average officer loss rate of 8.4%, 
whereas the SF branch surpassed it by 12.2%. Given the extensive duration in training in 
conjunction with the sheer high level of selectiveness, losing an SF officer is of significant 
monetary and informational importance. Excluding the immeasurable human value, it is 
safe to say that each officer who has made it through these extensive qualifications and an 
average of three years SOF experience; is worth spending a significant effort to not only 
maintain the force but get those who get out back.  
So begs the question, does ARSOF, particularly the SF branch, have a manning 
issue at the senior CPT and MAJ level? Again, this depends on the lens one is looking 
through, HRC or HQDA. The most significant issue boils down to the vast differences 
between HRC and HQDA regarding the strength of the force, either total strength or 
operational strength. HQDA is concerned with not overpopulating the force, keeping 
within the legal limits of the NDAA, while HRC is concerned with those on hand who are 
or will be in the fight. Until HRC and HQDA can bring those two lenses closer together, a 
definite answer cannot be given.  
A recommended course of action would be to explore making the SF branch a tier 
1 Special Missions Unit (SMU), which is controlled by the Joint Special Operations 
Command (JSOC) of USSSOCOM.181 A decision that would take a congressional 
approval. Moreover, SOF could provide direct commissioning capability to the branch, 
allowing branch managers to quickly manage the size of the force and strength of its officer 
corps. Personnel in Tier 1 units such as the Sea, Air, and Land Forces (SEAL) are not 
constrained by the promotion requirements as the ARSOF. JSOC units, like special 
operations aviation, can go in and out of conventional units, not constrained by the limited 
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material and immaterial positions.182 Currently the ARSOF is considered a Tier 3 unit 
much like conventional units.183 Like Medical, JAG, Cyber corps, and Tier 1 units, SF 
personnel have specialized skills that are limited to a small population. Such a resource 
should not be constrained to a traditional up and out system with promotional requirements 
and constraints of HQDA.  
Another possible solution would be to govern the SF branch as a hybrid between 
the ACC and those restricted in subsection b. Doing so, would require a reduction of the 
officer force and allocate immaterial positions that specifically compliment career 
development. However, this does not fix the issue of limited command opportunities SF 
faces. In comparison, the SF MAJ population (524) is roughly the same size as that in the 
Armored Branch (537).184 Currently, there are only 20 Battalion Command opportunities 
for SF officers versus over 100 for Armored.185 Allocating more command opportunities 
or eliminating command as a requirement for career progression for ARSOF officers could 
possibly encourage retention of talented SF officers as many see a limited opportunity for 
command and promotion. 
B. OFFICIAL ALUMNI PROGRAM 
We highly recommend that SOF and one day the Army create an official alumni 
program for each of its branches so that social capital can be retained and recruiters can 
utilize it as another recruitment pool for future employment of boomerang Soldiers. In a 
2019 Rand Research project about “Social Media and the Army Implications for Outreach 
and Recruiting” they were able to determine the effectiveness of several online and social 
media platforms used by the Army. The study focuses on GoArmy.com and the Facebook 
and Twitter accounts maintained by the Army Marketing and Research Group (AMRG) as 
these three platforms are primary means of communication and outreach. By analyzing 
various measures to understand how potential recruits and others are engaging with these 
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platforms they were able to ascertain that GoArmy.com is mostly just an information 
source. GoArmy’s Twitter is a good source for building awareness of Army culture, but 
the platform is less effective in producing contracts while GoArmy’s Facebook page has 
an audience made up of the general public, soldiers, veterans, military families, and 
potential recruits.186 A similar study on building a formal SOF alumni network that could 
be broken down into formal subsections by group or unit would truly help in its formation 
and content creation. Furthermore, before creating a formal SOF focused alumni network 
a study of current unofficial SOF alumni networks should be conducted so that best 
practices and lessons learned can be incorporated into the newly centralized formal SOF 
alumni network. 
Lastly, since senior captains denote the most- common point of officer talent loss 
for the SOF branch the effects of COVID-19 in 2021 may be an opportune time to fill the 
SF shortage of Majors.187 Many left the service in years prior and may have found that the 
grass is not greener on the other side as the unemployment rates across the country struggle 
to decrease. This could serve as a limited time boomerang policy to plus up numbers and 
see how well the boomerang program could work in a much smaller highly targeted scale.  
C. RECOMMENDED BOOMERANG PROGRAM  
A boomerang program results in turnover not being an end state. There are 
boomerangs in the military, but there should be more. Rigidly linear by design the Army 
employment cycle would transform with a boomerang recruitment strategy into a self-
feeding circle for those returning to the service.188 The Army has made turnover an end 
state but it does not have to be this way for all Soldiers. Therefore, we highly recommend 
that the Army implement and maintain an aggressive boomerang program for SOF, one 
that resembles similar policies from the civilian sector and broken down into three broad 
stages of implementation.  
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1. Initial Stage  
In 2016 over 3 million workers left their jobs by choice to fill the record setting 5.9 
million jobs that were on the open market. Numerous surveys and exit interviews by the 
business sector helped businesses address the reasons for the mass exodus and how to 
mitigate it.189 To set the stage for implementing a strong boomerang strategy in recruiting 
and retention for SOF. The military must first focus on thorough exit interviews like 
DACES to obtain why they are leaving, recommended improvements and what it would 
take for them to come back. Additionally, the exit interview will convey the military’s 
openness to allowing good standing Soldiers to reenter service later. These exiting Soldiers 
of good standing should be placed in a boomerang applicant database like the Recruit 
Market Information System (RMIS), as passive talent that can be harnessed by SOF 
recruiters. A month before the exit interview the Soldier is sent an email to join the SOF 
branches alumni network site and during the interview the benefits of this site will be 
explained.190 
2. Middle Stage 
With the advent of behavioral, contextual and geo targeting; organizations like the 
military can deliver tailored tri-monthly messages that are shaped to the interests of specific 
individuals to build trust and influence their decision to re-enter military service. The 
military must not let ego get in the way, for former Soldiers are still valuable assets in the 
future even after they leave. Therefore, how a Soldier exits the military may be just as 
crucial in their overall retainment as the way in which they were onboarded. Ensure their 
exit is orderly and free of overt hindrance as failure to do so will burn a bridge for future 
recruiters. In addition to a generic tri-monthly newsletter highlighting updates and job 
opportunities for boomerangs back in service, emphasis will be placed on updating contact 
info through the alumni site. SOF recruiters should personally reach out annually by email 
to ask how things are going. This proactive strategy is ideal in opening windows for the 
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recruiter to point out positive changes or outline how former soldiers would reintegrate 
back into the service.191 
3. Final Stage 
When boomerang Soldiers return the military must ensure that their reintegration 
is as thorough and painless as possible. Ease them back into the job with a clear customized 
onboarding workflow and leaders should track interactions to ensure they are being 
included as a valued member of the team.192 We highly suggest that the Army conduct a 
similar Workforce Institute survey similar to what Kronos Inc. performed in 2015 so as to 
ascertain Soldier, HR and recruiter mindset about boomerang Soldiers. Once enough 
boomerang soldiers have re-entered service SOF can further investigate restricting 
boomerang recruiting strategies to a predefined group of prior service Soldiers that proved 
the most effective. Exit interviews and evaluation reports would be excellent data sources 
to make boomerang recruitment more efficient.193 Thus, separating the elements that 
differentiate boomerangs from Soldiers that will not return will help human resource 
analysts target their recruitment and retention efforts.194  
The fact is the grass is not always greener on the other side of the service. Many 
things can change from when a Soldier exits. Their relationship or child situation may have 
changed. They may have gotten a mundane civilian job or the job of their dreams but miss 
the camaraderie of service and feeling like they belong to something bigger than an 
organization that gives them a high paycheck. Whatever the reasons, setting the stage for 
boomerangs to know that they can return is a large part of the battle for getting great talent 
back in service. Lastly, Army senior leaders must support the boomerang policy and alumni 
program implementation fully if it is to succeed. If not, the program will end up like the 
CIP, an overall unsuccessful program for the Army since it never received full senior leader 
support. 
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VIII. LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. LIMITATIONS 
This study is one of the first military application examinations of boomerang 
Soldiers but has various limitations. First, our analysis and recommendations were derived 
from the civilian corporate business sector. Though some corporations employ over 
200,000 personnel most businesses do not have the massive personnel size of the U.S. 
Army which may influence the comparative aspects of this study. Second, the 
recommended boomerang program and advanced centralized alumni program are merely 
an outline for such systems to be established as breaking down all the details requires much 
further refinement. Lastly, a limitation found in all studies is that we, like all others before 
us, were unable to make precise estimations regarding the actual value proposition of 
rehiring former employees or former Soldiers. Nevertheless, we were able to discern that 
in general the hiring of former Soldiers could resemble the civilian sector which averages 
the cost of a boomerang to be only 33% of a new hire. Overall, hiring a boomerang saves 
time, money and resources but we were unable to determine the exact amount of cost 
savings. 
B. DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Studies on the economic factors affecting boomerang hiring practices is ongoing as 
current results have proved mixed and inconclusive. There are currently two arguments 
that are under study. First, is that boomerang hiring is sometimes more common when the 
economy is slower and unemployment rates are higher because job availability is lower. 
Thus, boomerang employees are more likely to consider their former employer due to this 
lack of jobs.195 The Second argument is that a strong economy with low unemployment 
shrinks talent pools and makes the prospect of hiring a boomerang employee more 
attractive.196 Until conclusive data proves either of these arguments valid in the civilian 
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sector this issue of economic linked affects to hiring boomerangs will remain a viable point 
of ongoing study. 
Another economic issue that has boomerang recruitment ties is the defense budget 
implications of the COVID-19 pandemic that is already having a negative effect on the 
U.S. economy. With businesses laying off enormous amounts of employees due to financial 
issues there are immense short- and long-term implications for the DoD budget with 
possible economic losses of $11 trillion over the next 10 years. Historical analysis proves 
that pandemics have widespread macroeconomic effects, and this may put the DoD under 
increased financial pressure.197 With this turn of events there are two boomerang 
opportunities that are slowly presenting themselves. First, is that the willingness of 
previously separated SOF Soldiers to re-join military service may increase dramatically as 
the economy struggles. In the business and government sector often, it is the newest 
employees that are laid off first and some of those laid off will be former SOF Soldiers that 
separated service for the civilian sector. Even if they end up not getting laid off, fast 
promotion and incentives may dry up, finding that many of the merits and bonuses of the 
civilian workforce are no longer available. This is the perfect time in which to target for 
recruitment back into SOF since the grass on the other side will indeed have turned out not 
to be greener. Second, the ability of SOF to pay high bonuses and S&I pays for retention 
may be outside DoD fiscal possibilities in a struggling economy. Thus, it may be much 
cheaper to recruit formerly separated Soldiers. Paying exhaustively high bonuses to keep 
them in service or increasing the training pipeline may prove fiscally imprudent. Further 
research on this would shed light on how this issue could be solved with a boomerang 
Soldier policy. 
Another area that needs further exploration is the applicability of the boomerang 
program when the DoD faces significant budget cuts in the near future. Whether financial 
cuts are brought about by COVID-19, Chinese trade wars or the more historically proven 
actions of presidential elections. With reduced funding for current and future programs, the 
DoD would have to take preemptive action by also implementing a manpower drawdown 
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plan like in 2012. Such actions as the temporary early retirement authority (TERA) and 
voluntary separation pay (VSP) can quickly cut numbers of Soldiers but are only temporary 
mechanisms that are often turned off once numbers are met or a new president is elected 
and DoD funding is increased.198 Figure 5 shows that funding rises and drops rather 
predictably as every presidential election year elevates uncertainty regarding the defense 
budget, since election outcomes often change policies for DoD funding.199 Frequently, 
years after the Army has separated Soldiers they often need increasing numbers only a few 
years later. The boomerang program would be an ideal financially conservative mechanism 
in which to get strength numbers back on track. With very little research focusing on the 
effects of self-imposed attrition and force drawdowns the boomerang program could prove 
extremely effective in a fiscally conservative future that needs increased troop strength 
quickly at a reduced cost.200   
 
Shows the rising and falling trends of DoD funding according to past presidents.  
Figure 5. DoD Funding Trends 201 
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Based on recent studies in the business sector it is still debatable whether push 
factors like overall dissatisfaction usually resulted in alumni while pull factors like personal 
life issues or job opportunities led to boomerangs. However, a correlation was found that 
most alumni moved to totally different lines of work or different industries while the 
majority of boomerangs often moved to a similar industry. Additionally, when the main 
reason for leaving was another job offer the study revealed that the employee’s odds of 
returning were twice as likely than that of any other employee. The study also revealed that 
most future alumni left their job after three years while the majority of boomerangs left 
after one year. Thus, those Soldiers that leave earlier in their career are more likely to come 
back.202 Lastly, the study showed that minorities are more likely to turn into boomerangs. 
This could be occurring due to minorities tendency to job hop or because businesses are 
targeting more prior employees that are minorities.203 All these findings deserve further 
study so that the Army can better pinpoint who are going to be the most likely boomerang 
recruits. Additionally, for boomerang Soldiers there needs to be further research on what 
the best mechanisms are for enticing boomerangs back to service. Whether it is a decrease 
in rank and a small ADSO bonus or a decrease in rank to gain more time on an ODA, the 
right set of incentives are needed and should be different for each individual branch of 
SOF. 
Additional areas identified that need further study are numerous. One crucial area 
however is how long a possible boomerang employee should be pursued. A phenomenon 
referred to as the “honeymoon-hangover” effect occurs in many former employees within 
one year of leaving and taking another job. This effect has spurred many former employees 
to become boomerangs after just one year, with over 85 percent of boomerangs returning 
in less than three.204 Based off this civilian sector data it is recommended that SOF 
recruitment managers focus efforts in the first year after exit and then on possible second 
and third year boomerangs. Prior employees who returned within a year or two of departure 
showed few difficulties reintegrating or remembering past knowledge and skills. 
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Boomerangs that returned after three years needed additional training and enhanced 
reintegration efforts.205 Further research is needed to ascertain how many years a 
boomerang Soldier can still be pursued with profitable results. 
The alumni program is a great asset and tool to enable better boomerang recruiting 
strategies. However, more research is needed to discern actual quantifiable recruitment 
numbers expected from formal Army alumni programs. Companies have experimented 
with networking of former employees through receptions and social network sites and have 
found that on average these efforts only resulted in 25 percent of all boomerangs hired. 
While just over 60 percent were rehired through personal contact with a prior boss or 
manager. This gives credence to one-on-one networking methods as a great boomerang 
recruiting asset that deserves further study and possible incorporation into future Army 
boomerang recruiting strategies.206 Also further research is needed in the area of 
recruitment efforts using behavioral, contextual and geo targeting. Targeting possible 
boomerang soldier recruits with emails and outreach efforts based upon their interests, 
current events and economic downturns in certain areas of the country may prove beneficial 
if further developed. 
The Army expects significant recruiting challenges in the years ahead due to its 
recruiting goal that is double the size of the other services, with only 30 percent of young 
Americans able to meet service requirements.207 Thus, the last direction for future research 
is to try and better understand the economic and BRS effects on the future of recruiting and 
retention so as to better discern correlating effects on a boomerang recruiting program. 
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IX. CONCLUSION 
The issues of talent management seem to have plagued the all-volunteer force of 
the U.S. Army ever since 9/11. General Milley and Army Secretary Mark Esper have 
argued for better talent management and development of a system that is different than any 
other in the world.208 The need to retain such quality forces such as that in the SOF branch 
must not be hindered by outdated policies. Archaic promotion systems, such as the up or 
out system, have failed to capture the totality of a Soldiers capability and value. This has 
resulted in high quality Soldiers being forced out without the possibility of reclassification 
or reassignment. The Army’s predictable historical cycle of drawdowns followed by surges 
in recruitment often result in the wrong people being forced out. Soldiers that possess key 
attributes and skill sets, such as those in the SOF community, require greater flexibility in 
their career management. Ties sustained through a formalized alumni program and an 
implementation of a boomerang Soldier policy can ensure those Soldiers are recruited and 
ultimately retained back into service. 
Companies, businesses, corporations, and firms are created for one thing, and that 
is to obtain profits to ensure productivity. SOF and the military in general are more complex 
in their creation and on many other levels, but they can still benefit from innovative talent 
management strategies like the boomerang philosophy and formal alumni networks being 
used in the business sector.  
The private sector continues to outpace the Army’s talent management system 
through higher pay and innovative recruitment methodologies. Boomerang recruitment of 
former SOF members would not only enhance the force capability but offer greater 
flexibility to the enlisted ranks and especially to the officer corps. As the Army pushes for 
better talent management solutions, it will be continually hindered by strict unchanging 
policies and perceptions set forth in the past. Until they are altered to better enhance the 
recruitment of former SOF members, the Army will continue to struggle at maintaining 
both quantity and quality among the force.  
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Organizations across America are adopting boomerang employment as a talent 
management strategy to solve the problem of growing employee mobility. The strategies 
to communicate and maintain relationships with alumni and future rehires through a 
formalized alumni network are the foundations of effective boomerang employment.209 
Utilizing the communal power of their past and present employees, many organizations are 
discovering that there is no need to ever say goodbye.210 High performance Soldiers like 
those found in SOF create a competitive edge through specialized training, productivity, 
quality, innovation and sound decision making.211 They are unique talent worth pursuing, 
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